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Won-Seok Kim 
 
 
 
The defense industry became high value-added, capital- and technology-intensive. In 
order to become a magnate in the world arms market, a seller should interpret the essence, 
impact and influence factors of an offset trade, which is prevailing in the market. However, 
South Korea is still familiar to a position of importer, and there are a few studies on offsets in 
South Korea. For this reason, this paper aims to shed light on impacts and influence factors of 
offsets, especially the technology transfer which is recently increasing. Relevant theories, 
diverse arguments and counterarguments would be provided through literature review, and 
their validity would be assessed through the K-9 export case study. Unlike general 
recognition on offsets, the technology transfer is beneficial to a seller by attracting potential 
consumers. In addition, Possibility that the technology transfer makes a future competitor is 
much lower than expected. On the one hand, the proactive strategy can make up for a seller’s 
disadvantages in the arms market. Therefore, South Korea needs to aggressively utilize the 
technology transfer as the proactive strategy. Along with that, this paper recommends to 
avoid subcontracting and prepare relevant law and regulation. 
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І. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
According to World Development Indicator reported by the World Bank in July 2010, 
South Korea has the 15th biggest economic scale in the world(Cho, 2010). Although the GDP 
ranking of South Korea has declined from 2003 when it reported 11th ranking(Cho, 2010), the 
economic scale is still large. Apparently, what support economy of South Korea which has 
few natural resources are the exports. Because of the increasing exports, South Korea could 
rapidly overcome international financial crisis which started in late 2008. Even during first 
half of 2010, trade surplus of South Korea was $11.61 billion(Kim, 2010). In short, exports 
are the growth engine of South Korea’s economy. 
For the constant exports, new overseas markets should be ceaselessly exploited, and the 
world arms market is one of them. South Korea’s government recognizes potential of the 
world arms market, and decides to develop competitiveness of the own defense industry. 
However, the position of South Korea in the market is very unpresentable. The third largest 
importer in the world is not suitable for South Korea’s economic scale. It is apparently 
damage to South Korea’s balance of payment. 
 
Nation China India South Korea UAE Greece 
Share of global 
arms imports (%) 9 7 6 6 4 
Main supplier 
(share of recipient's 
transfers) 
Russia 
(89%) 
Russia 
(77%) 
U.S.A 
(66%) 
U.S.A 
(60%) 
Germany 
(35%) 
Table 1: The Five Largest Recipients of Major Conventional Weapons, 2005 -2009 (SIPRI, 2010) 
 
Then, what did make South Korea which has great manufacturing industries a net 
importer in the world arms market? As seen in Table 2, the main reason is that the world arms 
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market has been monopolized by a few Super Powers. Accordingly, South Korea has been 
familiar with a position of a consumer, and its interest on the defense exports has naturally 
been small. 
 
Nation U.S.A Russia Germany France U.K. 
Share of global 
arms exports (%) 30 23 11 8 4 
Main recipients 
(share of recipient's 
transfers) 
South Korea (14%) 
Israel (11%) 
UAE (11%) 
China (35%) 
India (24%) 
Algeria (11%) 
Turkey (14%) 
Greece (13%) 
South Africa (12%)
UAE (25%) 
Singapore (21%) 
Greece (12%) 
USA (23%) 
India (15%) 
Saudi Arabia (10%)
Table 2: The Five Largest Suppliers of Major Conventional Weapons, 2005 -2009 (SIPRI, 2010) 
 
With time, South Korea’s interest and investment in the defense R&D has grown, 
which have reduced the technological gap between South Korea and developed countries. 
However, development of studies on offsets from a viewpoint of a seller could not keep pace 
with these growths. In other word, South Korea is a skillful weapon-producer without 
marketing know-how. Majority of studies on offsets have been conducted from a point of 
view of an importing country. These focus on how to make up for the expenditure spent on 
weapons purchase through offsets. 
Naturally, studies on the technology transfer as offsets from a viewpoint of a seller are 
also insufficient. However, buyers’ requirements of the technology transfer are increasing in 
the world arms market. For this reason, a study on how to react to the requirement becomes 
important for an exporting country. There have been many studies on the technology in South 
Korea, but majority of them are regarding transfers between domestic organizations or a 
strategy as a recipient. As a result, almost studies focus on how to evaluate technology 
transferred as the compensation practice, how to calculate the technology fee, spin-on or 
spin-off between military and civil organization, and etc. Therefore, current situation on 
offsets and the technology transfer should be revised for development of the defense exports. 
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1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Under such requirement, it is decided to study offsets and the technology transfer from 
a viewpoint of a seller. As South Korea enters to arms exports competition, more studies on 
how to conduct an offset trade and how to react to requirement of the technology transfer are 
required. Currently, if a seller doesn’t compensate a buyer for something in the world arms 
market, a potential buyer doesn’t consume arms from the seller. In order to sell more 
weapons, a seller should study on the way to compensate efficiently. Especially, buyers’ 
demands of the technology transfer as offsets are increasing, but it is recognized that the 
transfer is very harmful because it transfers not only skill to use the arms but the technology 
to manufacture the arms. Thus, this paper has tried to answer to the following questions. 
Firstly, what are the defense industry, the defense export, and the technology transfer as 
one way of an offset trade? How different are they from commercial ones? 
Secondly, what are the impacts of an offset trade and the technology transfer on an 
exporting country? Is the technology transfer really harmful to a seller like pre-existing 
recognition? 
Thirdly, which factors do make a successful an offset agreement?  
Fourthly, in case of the K-9 export to Turkey, how are the impacts of the offset trade? 
In addition, how did factors affecting success of an offset agreement act in making the 
agreement? Especially, which factor is critical for South Korea with less experience on arms 
exports? 
Fifthly, how should South Korea as an exporting country act to increase defense 
exports in the world arms market? 
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2. SCOPE AND LIMITATION  
In order to answer to the first, second, third questions, this paper has reviewed the 
preceding researches and governmental reports. Then, to answer to the fourth question, 
collecting data from relevant governmental organizations, newspapers, and websites has been 
fulfilled. In the process, because of the national security problem, many data are restricted to 
access. Finally, for the fifth question, this paper tried to suggest method to utilize the 
technology transfer by applying what are founded in answering to the previous questions. 
The foreign literatures that this study has reviewed were almost written by scholars and 
governmental organizations of the U.S. and the U.K., or in English by Western European 
scholars. The world trend on offsets can be known indirectly by reviewing the U.S.’s offsets 
trend, because the U.S. has conducted one third of all arms exports. While there is no data to 
report all offset trades in the arms market, there are many studies and public reports regarding 
offsets conducted by the U.S. For example, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security has been 
reporting offsets to its Congress annually and frequently. In addition, the U.S.’s exports 
environment is similar to that of South Korea. Cho, Han, Park, Shin and Yang(2007) stated 
that nations with U.S.-origin arms are the potential consumer of South Korea, because South 
Korea’s weapons has high interoperabilities with the U.S.-origin arms. Thus, South Korea 
needs to study on how the U.S.’s consumers have conducted an offset agreement, and how 
the U.S. has reacted to that. 2nd biggest seller, Russia’s studies and reports on offsets are not 
suitable for this study. Because arms of Russia do not have interoperabilities with those of 
South Korea, its consumers are unlikely to be consumers of South Korea. Studies and reports 
of Germany and France, which are 3rd and 4th biggest sellers, are hard to access due to 
language problem. Therefore, this study has reviewed literatures written by the U.S., or 
Europeans in English. 
The scope of this study is limited to defense-related offsets, and especially the 
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technology transfer. In addition, as previously noted, the research scope is limited to a 
position of an exporting county. This paper is concerned with final products and main 
components which are required the high technologies in manufacturing themselves, not 
simple labor-intensive goods. 
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Ⅱ. THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
In order to answer to the 1st main question stated in the chapter І.1., this chapter 
provides theoretical background regarding the defense industry, the defense exports, and the 
technology transfer. Because terms used in this paper are related to military, these can cause 
confusion with meanings of general or civil terms. In addition, properties of relevant products, 
the market, and the technology transfer are different from those of commercial or general 
things. This chapter explains these differences.  
 
1. THE DEFENSE INDUSTY AND EXPORT  
The term “defense(defence)” lexically means the act of protecting somebody or 
something from attack, criticism, etc., and the term “industry” does the production of goods 
from raw materials, especially in factories. Therefore, as a compound word, the ‘defense 
industry’ is the production of goods used in protecting somebody or something from attack, 
criticism, etc. from raw materials, especially in factories. 
Recently, the term “defense industry” has almost become a proper noun, as its 
importance has drastically grown in the fields of national security, economy, and diplomacy. 
Many researches regarding the defense industry have been conducted, and in the researches, 
the defense industry is called an armaments industry or an ammunition industry, an war 
industry, and weapons industry or arms industry according to researchers’ inclinations or 
according to each nation’s recognition on the defense industry(Korea National Defense 
University, 2005). 
In the Western Europe, concepts related to the defense industry have been offered in a 
broader sense. The U.K. Ministry of Defence(2002) stated that the nation’s defense industry 
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“embraces all defense suppliers that create value, employment, technology or intellectual 
assets” in the country(p. 4). Recently, the term “the defense industrial base” is more 
frequently used. Examples include: “the defense industrial base consists of those industrial 
assets which provide key elements of military power and national security: such assets 
demand special consideration by government”(HCP, 1986, xxxii); or the defense industrial 
base “constitutes those companies which provide defense and defense related equipment to 
the defense ministry”(Dunne, 1995, 402). As a result, their common thing is that the defense 
industry provides goods related to the national defense, but all those don’t set a big portion on 
specific kinds of defense-related products. 
By contrast, South Korea sees the term defense industry as a restricted sense pursuant 
to kinds of final goods. According to Defense Acquisition Program Act(2008a), the defense 
industry means “the manufacture or research and development of defense materials”, which 
is designated by “the Administrator of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration” 
“after consultation with the Minister of Knowledge Economy”. The designate materials are 
“classified as weapons systems as defense materials, which are necessary for the securing of 
stable source of procurement, strict quality assurance, etc., [but,] that materials that are not 
classified as weapons systems but prescribed by Presidential Decree may be designated as 
defense materials”(Defense Acquisition Program Act, 2008a). Thus, this concept limits the 
scope of the defense industry to weapon systems and some certain products. 
Which products are ‘weapon systems’ and ‘some certain products’ can be known by 
defining and dividing the term defense contractor. A defense contractor is an enterprise that 
manufactures defense materials and is designated by the Minister of Knowledge 
Economy(DAPA, 2008a). The Minister shall classify the “contractor as either a major 
defense contractor or general defense contractor”(DAPA, 2008a). Enterprises that 
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“manufacture defense materials1” which article 35 of the Defense Acquisition Program Act 
states shall be appointed as Major defense contractors(DAPA, 2008a). By contrast with 
“major defense contractors, enterprises that manufacture other defense materials shall be 
general defense contractors”(DAPA, 2008a). 
Besides above concepts, there are many definitions about the defense industry, and 
they are in substantial agreement with each other. This paper focuses on the defense exports 
of South Korea, and the scope of this research becomes too huge if broad concept is used. 
Thus, DAPA’s concept is better for an efficient study. 
 
The defense industry has unique characteristics. The arms market is unusually a 
monopsony system that a military or a government is only a demander. In addition, actually 
pursuant to a criteria for industrial classification, the defense industry contains almost 
manufacturing sectors such as mechanic, metal, nonmetal, electricity, telecommunication, 
precisionㆍoptics, and chemistry(DAPA, 2008b). Thus, it exhibits unique characteristics 
comprising of own traditional properties and those from each industry. 
     First of all, the defense industry is a national security industry(DAPA, 2008b). While a 
principle of an ‘industry’ set a top priority on economic benefits, a core of ‘defense’ is the 
national security. Though a government tries to balance between the two, it should choose the 
national survival when the two values are incompatible with each other.  
     Holding a strong defense industry means that the country is relatively free from a 
                                            
1 Defense materials stated in article 35 of the Defense Acquisition Program Act are : 
Firearms and other fire power weapons; Guided weapons; Aircraft; Vessels; 
Ammunition; tanks, armored vehicles and other mobile combat equipment; radars, 
identification friend or foe, and other communication and electronic equipment; 
night observation devices and other optical or thermal imaging devices; combat 
engineering equipment; chemical, biological and radiological warfare equipment; 
command and control systems; or other materials that the Administrator of the 
Defense Acquisition Program Administration designates as recognized to be 
important for military strategy or tactical operations. (DAPA, 2008a) 
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potential risk such as lack of arms imported from abroad caused by trouble with the exporter. 
For instance, during the Falkland Island War, Argentina didn’t receive Exocet Missiles that 
had been imported from France, and during the Iraq War, even the U.S. did not get some vital 
components of weapons from Switzerland(DAPA, 2008b). Therefore, the defense industry 
can influence on implementing a military operation.  
     Due to the security problem, the defense industry requires a security blanket. A defense 
contractor can leak intelligence about own military power to enemies by opening information 
about weapon systems which the firm manufactures. For this reason, promotional activities 
on website or even promotional materials of a defense contractor need ex ante a security 
check by a government. 
Secondly, the defense industry is a high level of technology- and capital-intensive 
industry(Kim & Lee, 2001). A defense industry needs the most advanced scientific 
technology, and many equipments including the microwave oven and the internet have 
originated from a military part. Technology-intensive goods require research activities for 
long time and massive investment in production facilities, and furthermore it spends very 
long time from initial investment until commercializing military technologies and getting 
profits. Therefore, defense contractors should be able to secure high technologies and huge 
capital, and should take many risks accompanied with the process. 
Thirdly, because a national security is a kind of public goods, a defense industry also 
shows attitudes of public goods. While private goods are for one person and less to others, a 
public good is one which is capable of being used by many persons at the same time without 
reducing the amount available for any other person. Like that TV or Radio broadcasting 
provided by private company is a public good, the national security is also a public good 
despite weapons are produced by private defense contractors. Thus, inherent properties of a 
public good exist in producing weapons. Deciding how much to produce or who to pay is one 
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of such properties. A government as an agent of own people imposes tax on its people, 
estimates its people’s desire for security as weapons’ value, and pays for weapons. This 
process is much difficult policy-making or -implementing, so there is a possibility of 
inefficiency. In addition, because a probability of an externality is the biggest problem of a 
public good, a government should prepare for occurring of an externality. Therefore, a 
government is likely to or should intervene aggressively in the defense industry. 
Fourthly, it is very difficult to enter into the defense industry and to survive in arms 
market. Due to properties of a public good, only governments are the consumers of the 
defense industry. On the other hand, suppliers compete fiercely for sales with each other, and 
are at a disadvantage in deciding a price than a government. It has high possibility of a 
market failure, which makes firms hesitate to enter into a defense industry. For this reason, 
pre-existing defense contractors keep advantageous position by constantly developing 
relevant technologies. As a result, this deepening phenomenon becomes a barrier for new 
enterprises to enter into the defense industry.  
Fifthly, the defense industry makes ‘forwardㆍbackward effects’ on a national 
economy through national defense R&D and production activities regarding weapon systems, 
facilities, and equipments(Lee, 2008). An increase of the military power caused by the 
developed defense industry strengthens the national security, which causes stability of a 
society. In the stable society, economic activities become invigorated, and this condition 
guarantees sustained growth of the national economy. In addition, national defense R&D 
creates a spin-off effect on civil industries, and the defense exports contribute to growth of 
national economy. The developed economy invests more in the defense R&D, and such 
process repeats again and again. Therefore, development of the defense industry can make the 
virtuous circle with national economy. 
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Figure 1: Defense Industry and National Economy(Lee, 2008) with author’s own adjustment 
 
Besides above properties, there are many unique characteristics, and the details 
compared with general industries are listed briefly in Table 3.  
Classification General Industry Defense Industry 
Investment 
Scale Proper investment by market principles 
Massive investment by 
Purpose superiority 
Payback Minimum Longer 
Risk Low due to  demand forecasting 
High due to becoming stale of 
weapon system and etc. 
Product 
Purpose Firm’s pursuit of profit Superiority of performance to main enemy 
Deciding 
Production Based on marketability Based on weapon system 
Credibility Related to profitability Related to morale of army 
Form Simple Complex and diverse 
Accuracy Low Much higher 
Unit Price Low, economic efficiency High, non-economic efficiency 
Production 
Research 
Period Short Long 
Know-How Firm’s security National security 
Facility Simple Complex 
Volume Planned production (Demand forecasting) 
Build to order 
(Government’s plan) 
Growth of 
national economy
Stabilization of 
a society 
Activation of 
civil industries National Security
Increase of 
military power 
Defense Industry
Defense Industry
Exports 
National defense R&D
Weapon system and 
equipment production 
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Purchase 
Period of 
Delivery Firm’s control Government’s control 
Selecting 
Consumers Possible 
Impossible 
(Only government) 
Price Market competition, low Govern’s forecasting, high 
Contract Competitive contract Special appointment contract
Ripple Effect Abundance of national economy 
Leading technology-intensive 
industry 
Table 3: Comparison of Properties of Defense and General Industry(Moon, 2008) 
 
Along with the importance of the defense industry, the defense exports began to grab 
the attention. In October 2009, South Korea government established Korea Defense Industry 
Trade Support Center, which is a cooperative organization between the Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Defense Acquisition 
Program Administration. It was an intention to integrate efforts of each governmental 
organization and civil defense contractors, which revealed that the government had realized 
the importance of the defense exports and difficulty to foster those. The difficulty derives 
from unique properties of the defense exports. Kim, K.(2007) distinguished the properties 
according to four factors of marketing method: product; price; place; promotion. 
     Firstly, in the aspect of product strategy, it is almost impossible for a defense contractor 
by itself to invent and export military articles, if its own government does not demand the 
weapon systems(Kim,K., 2007). The U.S. GAO(1995) analyzed as follows: 
...potential customers abroad view domestic procurement of a product as an 
important endorsement of confidence and one that helps lower unit costs by 
increasing the economies of scale associated with a system. … it is very difficult 
for a company to sell a defense article if its own country’s defense department or 
ministry does not use the equipment. For example, ... Northrop’s F-20 was 
designed specifically for export; however, Northrop was unable to sell the 
aircraft overseas, in part, because the U.S. government did not purchase it for 
domestic use. (p. 9) 
Such analysis of GAO showed how critical a government’s purchase as an endorsement of 
confidence is. Decision-making of a government or an army should precede enterprises’ plan 
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to invent, produce, and export weapons. In addition, the use of an own country means that the 
army is developing the relevant field manuals, drill guidelines, and something related to the 
military articles. As a result, the weapon purchase of its own country is a premise to export it. 
     Secondly, in terms of price strategy, governmental decisions on the R&D costs and 
technology royalties are determinants of the unit price exported, which are required to secure 
price competitive in the international arms market(Kim,K., 2007). Of course, the capabilities 
of weapons are much more crucial than the unit price in the arms trade. If all the Required 
Operational Capabilities are met, the unit value will become the most important consideration. 
In deciding the unit price, while the researchers want to highly evaluate the R&D costs and 
technology royalties, consumers hope to cut that. Therefore, the governmental policy to 
satisfy both of developers and consumers is needed. 
     Thirdly, in the aspect of place strategy, some restrictions exist in choosing export 
routes, and these restrictions are both in exporting nation’s internal system and in the 
international arms market(Kim,K., 2007). The very powerful strategic weapons are likely to 
be prohibited to export because of the possibility to be used to attack or threaten the producer 
and its allies. For instance, an F-22 aircraft produced by Lockheed Martin needs approval of 
the U.S congress for its export. Besides, some cooperating arrangements2 prevent nations in 
the war and hostile states from importing powerful weapons. Thus, finding proper sales 
routes is not easy for a government and especially for a firm with insufficient information. 
     Fourthly, in terms of promotion strategy, effective increase in the arms export is 
impossible without cooperative efforts of a government, the army, and defense 
contractors(Kim, K., 2007). In the defense export, promotion factors are not only social-
cultural things mainly considered in exporting civil products, but military-related factors 
including the political-military ties, a military alliance, interoperability of weapon systems, 
                                            
2 For example, “Wassenaar Arrangement”, “Nuclear Supplier Group”, “Missile Technology 
Control Regime”, and “Australia Group”(Lee, 2008, 18). 
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military training theories, and military institution. However, these military-related factors are 
difficult for civil enterprises to access or recognize. Furthermore, because the officials of 
potential consumers in charge of weapons procurement works are likely to be incumbent 
soldiers, civil companies of selling countries need assistance of military including offers of 
sufficient information and intermediation by Military Attaches. 
     By the way, increase of defense exports is always not beneficial for a country, and 
there are some adverse effects caused by the increase. A major arms-exporting state is likely 
to be shown as an international public enemy that entices others in the war(Kim,K., 2007). 
For example, the biggest weapons exporting country, the U.S. has been suspected of making 
the war in order to sell more arms. In addition, drastic growth of the arms export may 
accelerate weapons build-up of states around an importing state, and raise international 
tensions(Kim, K., 2007). The growth of South Korea’s arms sales may also provoke the 
North Korea, and cause crisis of the war around the Han peninsula(Kim, K., 2007). 
     However, despite of the adverse effects, majority of countries are not indifferent to 
international arms exports, because becoming a magnate in the market gives various and 
enormous benefit. For this reason, South Korea has also tried to develop competitiveness in 
weapons exports. 
 
2. AN OFFSET TRADE 
The first time when the term “offsets” was used in the field of military sales was 1961 
at that time the U.S. government put pressure on Germany to purchase the U.S.-origin 
weapons in order to offset its military expenditure spent on troops stationed in Germany. 
After that, offsets were suggested to save the foreign currency in importing expensive 
weapons. In 1960s, European countries asked barter-type trade to the U.S. in buying U.S-
origin military items due to lack of foreign currency, so an offset trade was mainly utilized as 
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one way to remedy financial situations of the NATO nations for the post-war reconstruction. 
With time, offsets have become a tool to obtain essential technology in order to construct an 
independency of the importer’s defense industry(Weida, 1986). 
Offsets have been defined variously. The term “offset” has lexical meaning of using 
one cost, payment or situation in order to cancel or reduce the effect of another. In the field of 
arms trade, definitions of each nation or each organization are a little different. It can mainly 
be divided into two definitions of the buyer’s position and of the seller’s one. 
Definitions of an offset trade in the position of buyers are much positive, and focus on 
getting something. According to Defense Acquisition Program Act of South Korea, the term 
offset trade means “trade where a condition of reciprocal service, such as transfer of relevant 
knowledge, technology, etc., the overseas export of domestic weapons, equipment, parts, etc. 
is attached when purchasing weapons, equipment, parts, etc. from abroad”(2008a). 
Suman(2005, 2) defined offsets as “some sort of a leverage exploited by a buyer to obtain 
compensatory benefits by asking the seller to undertake well-designated activities to boost the 
economy of the buying country”. 
On the other hand, sellers’ definitions focus on paying something back for sales of 
military items as an inevitable action. For instance, “offsets are a range of industrial 
compensation practices required as a condition of purchase in either government-to-
government or commercial sales of defense articles and/or defense services as defined by the 
Arms Export Control Act(AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR)”(BIS, 2009, 35). In addition, Suman(2005, 2) stated that “offsets can generally be 
termed as formal arrangements of trade, wherein a foreign supplier undertakes specified 
programs with a view to compensate the buyer as regards his procurement expenditure and 
outflow of resources”. Therefore, in the position of sellers, an offset trade is, for more 
weapon sales, a military and industrial activity of an exporting country which pays back 
16 
 
partially to an importing country. 
 
Currently, many arms-importing countries are asking an offset trade due to several 
reasons. As noted earlier, for importing countries, the initial reason to pursue an offset trade 
was to save foreign currencies. For the European countries which tried to reconstruct their 
economies after the World War ІІ, and for current less developed or developing countries, an 
offset trade is an opportunity to acquire modernized weapons by paying less money.  
With time, countries have become to recognize the importance of the defense industry, 
and to utilize an offset trade as a tool to build up the industry. Neuman(1985) stated that more 
countries are asking manufacturing know-how than hardware, and an offset is useful for that. 
Weapon-manufacturing technology is difficult to obtain from other countries due to reasons 
related with their national defense problem, and besides, succeeding in the R&D is more 
difficult. For this reason, as another way of an offset trade, an industrializing country that 
imports arms can require an industrialized country that exports the arms to invest in the own 
defense industry(Han & Lee, 1998). Such investment helps the buyer’s defense industry grow 
up, and the growing industry maintains and raises employment(Neuman, 1985). Therefore, an 
offset agreement can be a steppingstone to develop a baby defense industry of an importer. 
In addition, developing countries are regarding an offset trade as mechanisms to 
encourage export earnings and economic growth(Neuman, 1985). Through an offset trade 
such as the counterpurchase, they can access to new markets of selling countries to export 
their commodities, and enlarge preexisting markets by using the distribution network of 
sellers. An importing country can also force an exporting country to choose its firm as a 
subcontract to manufacture parts of the military item targeted, which gives a firm of a 
consumer a chance to compete in the market(Han & Lee, 1998). Therefore, an offset trade 
becomes a great tool to open a new market or to raise exports for an industrializing country. 
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According to Neuman’s study, an offset trade provide a buyer with a “way of 
disguising the discounting of exports, a means of undercutting the prices set by international 
commodity agreements”(1985, 71). While exporting a commodity at world price, a 
developing country is likely to pay more for a military item than expected price. This is 
actually a kind of price-cutting of an importer’s product that encourages exports without 
causing a trade dispute with other competitors that export same commodity, and 
simultaneously without getting penalties of antidumping measures from a contracting party. 
As a result, an offset trade can be a kind of dumping measure of a developing country. 
Along with the aspect of exports, the fact that sometimes imports is possible through 
only offsets is crucial for LDCs. Neuman(1985) noted that LDCs circumvent IMF’s 
regulation on their imports by using an offset trade. IMF forces LDCs to reduce trade deficit 
by importing less, however LDCs justify their imports by using offset trade. 
Besides economic reasons, political interests have contributed to the trend of increasing 
offset trades. Politicians promise increase of the jobs, industrialization, and other economic 
benefits through an offset trade. In addition, sometimes an offset trade is promoted as a 
symbol of national prestige or solidity with a world power by politicians(Neuman, 1985). 
Thus, an offset trade with a developed country is a useful tool for politicians of less 
developed or developing countries. 
From a military viewpoint, offset trade is an opportunity to procure a maintenance skill 
in depot(Han & Lee, 1998). Serious breakdowns of arms are repaired not by users, but by 
experts in a depot. However, if there is no one who has maintenance skill in an importing 
nation, the weapons should be transported to the nation which manufactured the weapon. The 
absence of a main weapon system during transportation, repair, and return can be a risk for 
national security. Money spent on the process is also huge damage to the army. Thus, 
acquiring a maintenance technology in depot through an offset trade lets the army save times 
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and moneys. 
By contrast, arms-exporting countries have conducted offset trade due to completely 
different reasons. Especially, the U.S. has experienced many offset trades, and recognized the 
necessity. The 14th Report to the Congress by US Bureau of Industry and Security revealed 
this main reason(2009) : 
…the Government considers offsets to be “economically inefficient and trade 
distorting,”3 and… [However] U.S. prime contractors generally see offsets as a 
reality of the marketplace for companies competing for international defense 
sale…[and]offsets are usually necessary in order to make defense sales … (p. i)  
The U.S.’s point is that an offset trade is better than no sale at all. Today, it is more correct to 
say that exporting countries can sell weapons and maintain market share because they have 
something to compensate importing countries. Therefore, for sellers such as the U.S., offset 
trade is not a choice, but a necessity. 
Securing suppliers of components of a final weapon is also one reason of conducting an 
offset trade for industrialized countries. Neuman(1985) stated that even nations that have own 
developed defense industries cannot have the resources or the capacity to guarantee across-
the-board arms production. Any states cannot always export, and importing intermediate 
commodities from nations with low wage level is cheaper than domestic production or 
purchase. Therefore, even industrialized states need to secure steady suppliers of raw 
materials or intermediate commodities, and offsets help that. 
In case of technology transfer as a compensation practice, a license fee or a royalty is 
also economic benefit for exporting countries. These give an exporting country constant 
                                            
3 Regarding the negative effects of an offset trade, BIS stated as follows: 
When an offset agreement requires a high proportion of subcontracting, co-
production, licensed production or purchase transactions, it negates some of the 
economic and industrial base benefits accrued through the defense export sale. 
(2009, iii)  
[For example,] an exporting country’s prime contractors develop long-term 
supplier relationships with overseas subcontractors based on short-term offset 
requirements. (2009, 14) 
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income. 
As previously shown, for importing countries, an offset trade has become an 
unforgivable method in trading arms due to several reasons. On the other hand, for exporting 
countries, an offset trade is not a pleasant, so they are be likely to be passive to offsets. 
  
In order to satisfy such several motives, there are several methods of offsets. This paper 
reveals the classification and each definition officially used by the U.S. government, which is 
the most systematic. 
An offset trade can be distinguished according to the compensation method; 
“coproduction, licensed production, subcontractor production, overseas investment, 
technology transfer, countertrade”(BIS, 2009). U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security(2009) 
defined each offsets as follows: 
 
Co-production : Overseas production based upon government-to-government 
agreement that permits a foreign government or producer(s) to acquire the 
technical information to manufacture all or part of [a seller]4-origin defense article. 
Co-production includes government-to-government licensed production, but 
excludes licensed production based upon direct commercial arrangements by U.S. 
manufacturers. (BIS, 2009) 
 
Licensed Production : Overseas production of [a seller]4-origin defense article 
based upon transfer of technical information under direct commercial arrangements 
between a manufacturer and a foreign government or producer. In addition, 
licensed production almost always involves a part or component for a defense 
system, rather than a complete defense system. These transactions can be either 
direct or indirect. (BIS, 2009) 
 
Subcontractor Production : Overseas production of a part or component of [a 
seller]4-origin defense article. The subcontract does not necessarily involve license 
                                            
4 The Report, “Offsets in Defense Trade” published by US BIS originally used the term “U.S.” 
instead of “a seller”. 
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of technical information and is usually a direct commercial arrangement between 
the defense prime contractor and a foreign producer. (BIS, 2009) 
 
Overseas Investment : Investment arising from an offset agreement, often taking 
the form of capital dedicated to establishing or expanding a subsidiary or joint 
venture in the foreign country. (BIS, 2009) 
 
Purchases : Procurement of off-the-shelf items from the offset recipient. Often, but 
not always, purchases are indirect by nature. Indirect purchases are similar in 
definition to countertrade, while direct purchases are analogous to buy-backs. (BIS, 
2009) 
 
Technology Transfer : Transfer of technology that occurs as a result of an offset 
agreement and that may take the form of research and development conducted 
abroad, technical assistance provided to the subsidiary or joint venture of overseas 
investment, or other activities under direct commercial arrangement between the 
defense prime contractor and a foreign entity. (BIS, 2009) 
 
Training generally includes training related to the production or maintainance of 
exported defense item. Training, which can be either direct or indirect, may be 
required in unrelated area, such as computer training, foreign language skills, or 
engineering capabilities. (BIS, 2009) 
 
 
Figure 2: Classification of Offset Trade(Neuman, 1985) 
 
Compensation BarterCounterpurchase 
Switch Trade 
Offset
Coproduction 
Licensed 
Production 
Subcontractor
Production 
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Investment
Technology 
Transfer 
Countertrade
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Distinguishing these offsets clearly may be a little confused. Especially, co-production, 
licensed production, and subcontractor production are similar in the aspect of overseas 
production. However, some distinction can be shown according to whether doers of the three 
offsets are government or not, and whether technical information is provided. In addition, 
technology transfer is differentiated from co-production or licensed production, which 
provides technological information to the trade partner, from the viewpoint that import of 
components of arms is not occurred.  
On the one hand, an offset trade is divided into two primary groups, direct and indirect 
offsets, according to relation between a compensation practice and a weapon system targeted 
in the main contract. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security(2003) defined each offsets as 
follows:  
 
Direct Offsets : Contractual arrangements that involve defense articles and services 
referenced in the sales agreement for military exports. These transactions are 
directly related to the defense items or services exported by the defense firm and 
are usually in the form of coproduction, subcontracting, technology transfer, 
training, production, licensed production, or financing activities. (BIS, 2003) 
 
Indirect Offsets : Contractual arrangements that involve defense goods and services 
unrelated to the exports referenced in the sales agreement. These transactions are 
not directly related to the defense items or services exported by the defense firm. 
The kinds of offsets that are considered "indirect" include purchases, investment, 
training, financing activities, marketing/exporting assistance, and technology 
transfer. (BIS, 2003) 
 
The Figure 3 shows that offset transactions distinguished according to that the 
compensation method belongs to which part of direct or indirect offset trade. BIS(2009) 
discovered the new trend of offset trades in the international arms market. In the aspect of 
value of offset trades in 1993 ~ 2008, the U.S. has made more indirect offset transactions, on 
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average 60%, than direct offset transactions, on average 40%. However, in 2008, the values 
of direct and indirect offset trade approximately account for half respectively. The trend has 
been caused by the views of importing countries that direct offset is more efficient to foster 
their own defense industries. 
 
 
Figure 3: Classification of Offset Transaction Categories(BIS, 2009) 
      
This phenomenon has relation with development level of trade partners. Brauer(2004, 
59) stated that “DCs tend to negotiate direct arms trade offsets, and LDCs tend to negotiate 
indirect offsets”. GAO’s analysis(1996) showed that developed countries such as Netherland 
and United Kingdom can usually make link between offsets and their own defense industry. 
By contrast, newly industrialized countries such as Singapore and South Korea link offset 
trades more to non-defense industries, and less industrialized countries such as UAE and 
Saudi Arabia integrate only to non-military industries(GAO, 1996). When considering rapidly 
increasing development levels of NICs and LICs, arise of the direct offsets has been not an 
accident. 
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3. THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AS OFFSETS 
A concept of the technology is very broad, and is recognized variously on how you see 
it. Among the various concepts, the technology provided to an importing country as a 
compensation practice in an offset trade is certainly the military technology or the dual use 
technology. Kim(1990) stated that the defense technology is the technology developed for the 
purpose of contributing to national security by procuring technical superiority of national 
defense. Hong(1993) defined the dual-use technology as the technology to be able to improve 
both security capability and industrial competitiveness in a military sector and in a private 
sector. These two technologies are the main subjects of this paper.  
Kinds of the technology transfer also vary. The technology transfer can be classified 
according to relation between a transferor and a transferee. Walker and Ellis(2000) divided 
the transfer of technology into intra-organizational (including transfers between functions and 
divisions), inter-organizational (including intra- and inter-industry) and inter-economy 
(focusing on the macro-economy rather than transfer at the company level). Though none of 
these categories is mutually exclusive, the technology transfer as one way of an offset trade is 
categorized into inter-economy transfer because it usually occurs across the border. 
On the one hand, based on which technology is dealt with, the technology transfer as 
an offset trade can be categorized. As forms of the technology transfer, U.S BIS(2007) cited 
“research and development conducted abroad, exchange programs for personnel, data 
exchanges, integration of machinery and equipment into a recipient’s production facility, 
technical assistance, education and training, manufacturing know-how, and licensing and 
patent sharing”(p. 2-7).  
These technology transfers can broadly be divided into two groups, direct and indirect 
offsets. Figure 3 shows that the technology transfer may be either direct or indirect offset 
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trade.  
Then, why or how many have the technology transfers as offsets increased in the arms 
market? 
There are R&D and introduction of technology as main ways to procure the defense 
technology. Each of two ways has pros and cons respectively, and there have been many 
controversies on which of two is better. Especially, Chang(2004) stated procuring the defense 
technology through R&D has risk because of its uncertainties. In other word, there are 
technological uncertainty, cost uncertainty, and market uncertainty in conducting R&D. In the 
field of military, the rapid evolution of weapons has made the pre-existing defense 
technologies become stale, and the possibility on failure of technology development is great 
because sometimes researchers should study the new R&D area. In addition, it usually takes 
huge amount of money, very long time and a lot of efforts to verify the probability on 
utilization of a weapon system developed, because it should complete a set of course 
composing of production of a prototype, test and evaluation, production, deployment, and 
operation. Furthermore, while R&D requires much investment, demands for a weapon 
manufactured by using the technology may be a few and limited. Therefore, even deciding to 
conduct R&D is hard either for a government or for a firm. 
 
Classification Research & Development Initial deployment 
Deployment 
completion 
K-9 Self-propelled 
Artillery 1989 ~ 1998 1999 2010 
KT-1 Trainer 1988 ~ 1998 2000 2005 
Short-range Surface to 
Air Missile 1987 ~ 1999 1999 2010 
Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle(UAV) 1991 ~ 2000 2002 2004 
Table 4: Fielding Period of Main Military Equipments Developed by South Korea  
(Ministry of National Defense, 2002) 
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For these reasons, introduction of the defense technology from abroad which is a 
relatively stable way is popular for governments of developing or less developed countries 
that want to foster the defense industry rapidly. Actually, nations such as Israel, India, and 
Brazil, which have become magnates in exporting arms, had pursued a strategy of procuring 
weapon systems through introduction of technology from abroad, and then had reached a 
reasonable level of proficiency in weapons production through constant development and 
accumulation of technologies(Kim & Lee, 2001). Therefore, countries, which have watched 
their successes, are interested in the technology transfer from industrialized countries. 
In addition, even if one pursues the R&D method in acquiring the defense technology, 
it is certainly designed to face the technology transfer problem. Precisely speaking, the R&D 
and introducing technology from others are not exclusive each other. Ellis and Walker stated 
that any company cannot keep the R&D strategy in every technology and “there should be 
provision within the R&D strategy for the importation of technology, either to support current 
technology that is internally available or new technology that is required as a result of 
changes in strategic requirement”(2000, 99). In other word, introducing technology is a 
crucial part of the R&D. Therefore, introducing technology at the initial period is inevitable. 
However, introducing the defense technologies from abroad is also not easy for the 
developing or less developed countries. Highly expensive cost spent on getting license and 
loyalty has been a big burden for them. In addition, industrialized countries, which have 
already achieve great development of defense technology, don’t intended to provide the 
technology to others in order to preserve their monopoly position in the arms market, even if 
developing or less developing countries are likely to offer costly price for the technology.  
The solution for this problem is just an offset trade. As offsetting has become 
prevailing in trading arms, developing or less developed countries have regarded it as an 
opportunity of acquiring advanced military technology. For the U.S., while some other ways 
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of compensating have been reduced or changed slightly, the number of requiring the 
technologies as a compensation practices has gradually increased. The technology transfer 
accounted for 18.92 percent out of all 8 “transactions reported for 2008 based on 
quantity”(BIS, 2009). By calculating the value of technologies transferred to importing 
countries, the change of the technology transfer based on quality can be known easily, too. In 
1993, the technology that the U.S. offered to importing countries have actual value of 
$300,307,000 and credit value 5  of $320,504,000, but in 2008, the U.S. transferred 
technologies of actual value of $958,314,000 and credit value of $1,462,126,000(BIS, 2009). 
In other word, the trend that importing countries require the exporting countries to transfer 
the advanced military technology as compensation practices has become quite intensified in 
the arms market. 
 
 
Figure 4: Trend of the U.S.’s Technology Transfer as a Compensation Practice, 
1993-2008(BIS, 2009) with author’s own adjustment 
 
                                            
5 BIS defines the credit value as: 
The credit value is a value that some foreign governments provide as an incentive 
for certain kinds of offset transactions. This value varies greatly by country and by 
the kind of transaction (i.e., purchase, technology transfer, investment, etc.), but is 
normally more than the actual value. (2003, 11-12) 
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Figure 5: Value of the U.S.’s Technology Transfer as Compensation 
Practice,1993-2008(BIS, 2009) with author’s own adjustment 
 
     On the contrary to for importing countries, for exporting countries, transferring the 
military technology of which they have spent much effort, time, and money on development 
is not pleasant. Lopez and Loren(1988, 46) argued that “design and management of the 
critical transition … provide the recipient with greater overall expertise and a stronger 
position as a future competitor”. In addition, Schaffer stated that “the company must evaluate 
how much the loss of technology will hurt it in future bids against a new technologically 
enhanced competitor”(1989, 193-194). From their viewpoint, it can be known that future loss 
resulting from the technology transfer is the likely to be much greater current benefit from 
that. 
     For this reason, the U.S. government has particularly paid much attention on an offset 
trade issue regarding technology. Basically, the U.S. government does not participate in an 
offset agreement. A memorandum on a basic offsets policy signed by Duncan, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense stated that “because of the inherent difficulties in negotiating and 
implementing compensatory coproduction and offset agreements, and the economic 
inefficiencies they often entail, DOD shall not normally enter into such agreement”(Weida, 
Actual Value 
Credit Value 
$ 1000 
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1986, 108). It also means that the U.S. government does not prevent private company from 
entering into the agreement. However, there exist a few exceptions, of which representative 
one is the technology transfer. OMB(1985, 41) stated that the U.S. government’s involvement 
in offsets has occurred “primarily … to protect the technology involved,…”. It reveals that 
the technology transfer is a very critical and unpleasant problem for an exporting country. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. firms has made an offset agreement including the technology 
transfer, because only a few demanders exist in the arms market and sale with the technology 
transfer is better than no sale at all. When potential consumers require a certain level of the 
defense technology, transferring the technology with greater conditions than other sellers’ 
conditions is necessary for business in the arms market. Thus, for a seller, providing the 
military technology has become a crucial tool to survive in the world arms market. 
      
     In sum, the technology transfer as offsets has become very important both for 
developed exporters and for developing or less developing importers in the world arms 
market. For this reason, South Korea should construct a strategy to confront the problem 
regarding selling or transferring own defense technology. 
 
The technology transfer as an offset trade has distinctive properties. Of course, this 
transfer has common characteristics of a general technology transfer for the commercial 
purpose. However, while transfer of technology is generally conducted due to provider’s 
motive to sell own technology and recipient’s wish to get the technology, the technology 
transfer as offsets is implemented as a concomitant of the arms trade, not a main contract. 
Because it is hard to say that an exporting country usually wants to sell its technology, an 
approach only from a standpoint of studies on general technology transfer is not suitable for 
this study. Therefore, it needs research on the properties of the technology transfer 
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considering aspects of military offsets, the countertrade, and the inter-economy level. 
In transferring the technology, the maturity of technology and technical capability of a 
recipient are important factors. Initial level of technology which just finishes the R&D cannot 
be transferred, and if a recipient’ capability is not good enough to internalize the technology 
targeted, the transfer will go to the failure. Even technology which had no problem in 
producing a prototype may cause some troubles at the level of supplementation, mass 
production and final commercialization. Therefore, technology transferred should be at the 
level where a recipient can utilize the technology with only a little supplementation.  
According to the technical maturity of a recipient, a proposer of technology transfer as 
an offset trade becomes differentiated. There are two cases of that an importing country asks 
an exporting country to provide technology, and that an exporting country suggests the 
technology transfer to an importing country. The former happens when an importing country 
has a certain level of technology and information about the advanced technology, and the 
latter occurs when capability and information of an importing country are poor(Kim, Y., 
2007). 
Where the initiative in negotiation goes over is one difference between the general 
technology transfer and the one as an offset trade. In negotiating on the technology transfer, a 
provider is superior to a recipient in the general market, however in the international arms 
market, an importing country is at an advantage than an exporting country because the market 
is consumer-superior(Kim, Y., 2007). 
Computing the value of the technology transferred is the most important issue in 
making an offset trade agreement. An exporting county tries to exaggerate the value of 
compensation practice, and vice versa for an importing country. Converting the value of 
technology into the money is a little objective, so it is likely to cause some troubles between 
trade partners. Thus, understanding the technology-valuing process is helpful to taking an 
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initiative in the negotiation. 
The negotiation process would show one of two types according to the attitude of an 
importing country. A potential consumer country usually requires more than a certain portion 
of compensation practices of applicants which compete against each other to sell their own 
articles. An importing country chooses one of them as a trade partner whose suggestion firstly 
satisfies its demand, and detailed provisions are adjusted in negotiation. When an importer 
puts an emphasis on offset proportion of compensation practices, the negotiation mainly deals 
with adjustment of offsets value suggested. By contrast, if an importing country emphasizes a 
kind of the compensation practice, an importing country tries to acquire what it wants, 
acknowledging the offset value that an exporter wants(Kim, Y., 2007).  
As mentioned above, properties of the technology transfer as offsets are rather unique. 
The technology transferred should be one that can be utilized by a recipient with just slight 
adjustment. Value of the technology is a very important problem, and can be a main conflict 
between trade partners.  
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Ⅲ. IMPACTS OF AN OFFSET TRADE 
 
 
As mentioned in chapter Ⅱ, the defense exports are beneficial for an exporting nation 
or firm, but it cannot avoid offset obligations including technology transfer at the same time. 
Offsets have generally been regarded as being harmful to an exporter. With time, exporters 
become to know the real impacts of the military trade. It can say that the trade is success if 
overall impacts are positive. In other word, successful trade for exporters is that other positive 
impacts resulting from the main trade are greater than the negative impacts of offsets. Thus, 
realizing several impacts of defense exports and offsets is needed to know which offset trade 
is successful for an exporter. Diverse researches introduced in this chapter will tell diverse 
impacts of offsets, which are different from generally negative arguments stated in the 
chapter Ⅱ.  
Recently, because scale and range of the defense industry have been expanded 
enormously or complicatedly, it is hard to precisely estimate the impacts of the defense 
exports which may include considerations of economy, international politics, military, and etc. 
Furthermore, evaluating impacts of the military offset trade is more complex because it 
includes assumption that what if there was no offset provision. Thus, the U.S. has annually 
focused on assessment of impacts of offsets on only the employment, balance of deficit, 
competitiveness of the defense industry, and the defense preparedness “pursuant to Section 
309 of the defense Production Act of 1950”(BIS, 2009). This paper follows the U.S.’s 
assessment method.  
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1. IMPACTS ON EMPLOYMENT 
Job creation is the one of an importing country’s purposes of pursuing the military 
offsets, and there had been no doubt in the fact that an importing country benefits from the 
offsets in employment. However, some studies have disputed against that and discovered new 
one. For example, in South Africa, it was expected that a cost of R104 billion spent on a 
military offset agreement with European suppliers creates “65,000 new jobs over seven years”, 
but “amount to a cost of R1.6 million per job…, nearly 20 times the average cost per job in 
South Africa’s defense industry”(Dunne & Lamb, 2004, 288). In addition, a “case study on 
defense offsets in Saudi Arabia reveals that instead of a projected 75,000 local jobs, the 
various programs generated employment in the region of 2,000”(Dunne & Lamb, 2004, 11). 
From their point of view, creating new jobs through a military offset agreement is not very 
efficient for an importing country. 
On the one hand, there have existed many debates on whether an offset trade 
encourages employment of an exporting country, or not. Some have argued that an offset 
agreement enhances military sales, which causes increase of employment. On the other hand, 
some insists that because of offset obligation, prime contractors should make another contract 
with subcontractors of an importing country, which move jobs from an exporting country to 
an importing country. 
The former is based on the premise that without offset, arms exports would not be 
made. Some U.S. firm’s officials insisted that “many offset deals create new and profitable 
business opportunities for themselves and other U.S. companies,…[and]… export sales 
provide employment for the U.S. defense industry and orders for larger production 
runs”(GAO, 1996, 11). It is certainly true that new business and larger production runs is 
connected to more employment. For instance, “McDonnell Douglas claimed that if the United 
States did not sell 72 F-15E fighter-bombers to Saudi Arabia, 40,000 jobs would be lost”(FAS, 
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1994). In addition, the offsets negotiation requires a lot of administrative works such as 
document translation, for which demand gradually arises as time spent on negotiation 
increases. Regarding this, Bureau of Export Administration insisted that “additional employee 
with expertise in offsets often must be hired”(2001, 8). Even in case of indirect offsets, a 
prime contractor should also hire more workers such as marketing experts because the firm 
has to be responsible for sale of a buyer’s products, of which it has no specialty(BXA, 2001) . 
Finally, BIS concluded that “2002-2005 defense exports sales averaging $5.5 billion annually 
had a net positive effect on employment in the defense sector during the four-year 
period”(2007, 3-3). 
Furthermore, many studies have argued that at least, the offset trade does not affect 
adversely on an exporting county. In other word, by transferring some jobs to abroad, more or 
similar amount of jobs can be created. OMB(1988, 58) concluded that “the effect of offsets 
on total U.S. employment in minor, if not actually positive”. Besides, Weida(1986) stated: 
the direct effect on the U.S. economy of foreign weapon sales is very small 
[because] total foreign defense deliveries in most years support between two and 
three hundred thousand jobs in the U.S. private sector… [which is] less than half of 
one percent of total private employment. (p. 131-132)  
From their standpoint, the change of employment caused by the military offsets is a 
negligible quantity. 
However, there exists a critical problem that the damage of military offsets is 
concentrated on a certain part of the defense industry and its employees. The military offset 
trade moves jobs from subcontractors and lower tier suppliers to prime contractors and 
overseas firms.6 Another problem is an assumption regarding no offset. It is easier to 
calculate the possible employment under ordinary trade circumstance.7 BIS stated that “the 
$5.9 billion in reported offset transactions [in 2005 ~ 2008] would have created or sustained 
                                            
6  How military offset agreements made by prime contractors affect subcontractors and 
lower-tier suppliers will be explained in chapter Ⅲ.3. IMPACTS ON THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY. 
7 The U.S. regards military offset arrangement as trade distorting.  
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employment opportunities equivalent to approximately 59,000 U.S. aerospace sector jobs if 
the work associated with those transactions were performed in the United States”(2009, 17). 
Therefore, exporting countries worry about employment in subcontractors, and have 
unsatisfied feeling on possible employment under the ordinary trade conditions. 
This paper attempts to take one step, and there are two variables in the process. In other 
word, employment can vary in accordance with how to make up for and how a trade partner 
is developed or industrialized. 
Co-production, subcontractor production and licensed production are especially 
harmful to employment of an exporting country. These moves part or all of production 
facilities from home to overseas, which cause reduction of domestic jobs. Overseas 
investment is also not good to job creation of a seller. It reduces the potential of own 
employment by making investment in a foreign country, which instead could be spent on own 
domestic industry. By contrast, the technology transfer, training and credit assistance do not 
show direct effects on employment of an exporting country. These do not transfer any 
production facilities to a foreign country.  
In addition, the military offset trade with industrialized countries is more harmful to 
employment of an exporting country. Some military jobs was lost in the U.S. due to a military 
“offset agreements with highly industrialized countries such as the Netherlands and 
Switzerland”(Brauer, 2004). It means that even highly industrialized exporting countries such 
as the U.S. can be hurt by the military offsets with developed countries. Because 
industrialized countries have well-developed defense industrial bases, they have both 
intention to obtain defense-related compensation practices and capability to adjust 
specification over offset arrangement(GAO, 1996). In other word, industrialized countries 
usually demand direct offsets, of which main kinds are co-production, subcontractor 
production, and licensed production. On the other hand, developing or less developed 
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countries usually require indirect offset agreements, because they do not have sufficiently 
developed defense industries and capability to effectively negotiate. Therefore, the impacts of 
the military offset trade on employment can vary in accordance with the development level of 
a trade partner. 
In brief, effects of the defense offsets on job creation are different according to the 
position in the sales, a kind of compensation practice, and a trading partner. A buyer can take 
profit in employment, but is likely to obtain smaller jobs than expected. On the other hand, a 
seller should endure a structural change of employment, but its degree depends on a kind of 
compensation practice and the development level of a trade partner. 
 
2. IMPACTS ON BALANCE OF TRADE 
Arguments and their reasonings about impacts on trade balance show similar pattern to 
those on employment.  
Some, especially prime contractors, contend that the offsets raise the exports by 
attracting foreign consumers, and that foreign competitors would win the bids if nothing was 
made up for. From their standpoint, a certain percent of something is more profitable than 0 
percent of nothing, and for example, if the offset proportion is 60%, the net benefit becomes 
40% of exports. 
However, it cannot deny that fulfillment of the offset mandate is able to raise the 
imports. BIS stated that “almost 80 percent of offset transactions reported for the 1993 ~ 
2004 period fell in the manufacturing sectors of the U.S. economy, eroding U.S. production 
and workforce capabilities and the balance of payment benefits of the export”(2005, 3-1). 
This arise is concentrated on the intermediate commodities that could be produced by 
subcontractors and lower-tier suppliers of an exporting country. It also reduces own suppliers’ 
world market share. The market share reduced is connected to decline of capacity utilization 
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rate, which hugely affects their survival. If the subcontractors and suppliers collapse, imports 
of the intermediate commodities increase much rapidly. Though this process may be a little 
exaggerated, subcontractors apparently worry about their survival.  
The degree of impacts on trade balance also depends on a trade partner and 
compensating method. While co-production, licensed production, and technology transfer 
almost do not buy anything from an importing country, subcontractor production and 
countertrade surely make imports. Especially, BIS noted that “purchase, which are indirect 
offsets, can displace sales from the commercial manufacturing sectors of the U.S. 
economy”(2007, 3-1). In other word, countertrade causes much bigger arise in imports not 
only in the defense industry, but also in others. As above noted, LDCs usually demand 
indirect offset trade, which contains countertrade. LDCs’ main exports are raw materials and 
intermediate commodities, which compete against subcontractors and lower-tier suppliers of 
an exporting country. 
On the one hand, the negative effects of the defense offset agreement can be relieved 
by three factors(Kremer & Sain, 1992). The first is a multiplier, which “make it easier for 
prime contractors to fulfill their offset obligations by allowing for higher offset credit levels 
than normally granted”(BIS, 2007, 5-5). For example, the Canadian government allows more 
than one dollar of credit value for a dollar spent in underdeveloped provinces(Weida, 1986). 
The second one is a ‘time-discount rate8’ or ‘inflation rate’, which makes current value of 
military items exported more valuable and reduces value of compensation practices imported 
later. The third is that the large firms can recover the loss by extended business in other area. 
Regarding this, Shaffer said: 
Large companies, like Boeing, are finding that offset agreements are a way of 
expanding the scope of a transaction, creating more opportunities for profit. What 
                                            
8 The time-discount rate is the rate by which the future value is to be discounted to make it 
equal to the present value. 
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they give up in subcontractors and coproduction, they more than recover in service 
agreements, training, and market position in a country over time. (1989, 68) 
 
Like impacts on employment, impacts of the military offsets on trade vary in 
accordance with the position in the sales, a kind of a compensation practice, and a trading 
partner. While prime contractors more exports, subcontractors and lower tier suppliers are 
faced with reduction of sales. Subcontractor production, and especially countertrade certainly 
reduce trade surplus, and an offset trade with LDCs also does. However, the trade deficit can 
be mitigated by a multiplier, time-discount rate, and extended business of large firms in other 
areas. 
 
3. IMPACTS ON THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Like impacts of offsets on employment and balance of trade, estimating exactly its 
impacts on a seller’s defense industry is very difficult. Some have insisted that the impact is 
not good for domestic defense industry. Weida said: 
if the offset creates a new foreign manufacturer of arms, it has the potential to alter 
procurement patterns in the long run by lowering the growth rate and reducing the 
ultimate size of the U.S. defense industrial base. (1986, 118) 
By contrast, the opposite arguments have been suggested, and for example, OMB report in 
1988 stated: 
if the defense industrial base effects that may be attributed to offsets were 
significant, one would expect to see lagging competitiveness in this sector. In fact, 
at a time when other economic sectors are experiencing large trade deficits, 
aerospace exports have remained highly competitive and have continued to show 
large, growing trade surpluses. (p. 38) 
In addition, BIS estimated overall impacts of the military offsets, concluding that “the U.S. 
defense exports associated with the [offset] transaction do directly enhance U.S. defense 
production”(2007, 3-5). However, these are too broad, and it will be better to consider each 
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aspect of both prime contractor and subcontractors. 
In the military offset trade, prime contractors are the beneficiaries. Weida(1986) argued 
that “prime contractors structure offsets so that they derive the maximum benefit from offset 
agreement”(p.132). How to compensate the weapons-purchasing cost is determined by 
demand of a buyer and prime contractor’s intention to achieve maximum benefit. Thus, 
impact of the military offsets on prime contractors is certainly positive. 
On the contrary, impacts on subcontractors and lower-tier suppliers are likely to be 
negative. Prime contractors don’t need to consider domestic subcontractors’ and suppliers’ 
benefit, of which market position is weak. Weida stated that “subcontractors are to a large 
extent at the mercy of the primes when it comes to offset contracts”(1986, 7). From the 
perspective of international economics, the military offsets can be viewed as a kind of 
globalization or open trade, which is not just stuck in domestic suppliers. In other word, an 
offset trade makes suppliers enter into competition against foreign firms. Though 
consumers’ 9  surplus and total welfare becomes greater, domestic suppliers, of which 
products are imports-competing, are hurt by globalization. U.S. Office of Technology 
Assessment(1991) indicated that “global sourcing may already be making defense production 
more efficient, but in the long term, it will also tend to displace U.S. defense 
subcontractors”(p. 26).  
Furthermore, BIS(2009) pointed out that “U.S. prime contractors develop long-term 
supplier relationships with overseas subcontractors based on short-term offset requirements… 
[which] limit future business opportunities for U.S. subcontractors and suppliers”(p. 14). In 
other word, benefit of primes during short-term makes prolonged damage of subcontractors. 
Impacts of the military offsets on a seller’s defense industry vary in accordance with 
compensating method, and a trading partner. BIS(2007) noted : 
                                            
9 In the military offsets case, consumers of intermediate commodities are prime contractors. 
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defense subcontractors and suppliers, and in some cases portions of the prime 
contractor’s business, are displaced by exports that include Subcontract, Co-
production, or Licensed Production offsets. (p. 3-1) 
Especially, subcontract is the most fatal to domestic subcontractors and lower-tier suppliers, 
but unfortunately most popular for an importing countries in 1993 ~ 2008. In addition, it is 
direct offset trade, which is likely to occur in transactions with developed countries. 
 
Transaction Actual value ($ million) Credit value ($ million) # of Transaction 
Subcontract 10,857.64(22.18%) 12,004.24(20.85%) 2,249(62.28%) 
Total 48,961.05(100%) 58,317.72(100%) 3,611(100%) 
Table 5: U.S’s Subcontract Transactions,1993-2008(BIS, 2009) with author’s own adjustment 
 
4. IMPACTS ON THE DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS 
National security is the most important interest for every country and should be 
addressed prior to economic problems because survival is precondition for all. If the military 
offset trade affects adversely defense preparedness while enhancing economy including 
above employment, balance of trade and the defense industry, the transaction should not be 
approved. Studies on this problem agree on that exports increased by offsets can be salutary 
for the defense preparedness, but the transaction with a high proportion of offsets is injurious 
to that. 
The military offset trade can strengthen the national defense. Exports help not only 
economic development but national defense, because defense force of one nation is 
ultimately proportional to its economic scale. Offsets attract potential consumers, and value 
of military contract is usually enormous.  
In addition, exports caused by offsets help own military hold more arms at less 
expenditure. BIS(2007) stated that “exports of major defense systems helps defray high 
overhead costs for the U.S. producer”(p. 3-1). The reduction of production cost is generated 
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by the economy of scale. Besides importing countries, a government of an exporting country 
is purchasing the military article, so price reduced of the military article caused by cost 
reduction cuts down own government’s military expenditure. 
Increasing defense exports resulting from offsets allow flexibility to prepare for 
emergency. BIS(2007) stated: 
Exports of major defense systems … help maintain production facilities and 
workforce expertise for current and future U.S. defense need. The production 
capabilities and workforce are also available in case they are needed to respond to 
a national emergency. (p. 3-1) 
Because average capacity utilization rate of defense contractors is generally low, surviving in 
the world arms market is very difficult for a defense contractor. Constant sales through 
defense exports maintain or raise capacity utilization rate of defense contractors, and prevents 
quality talents’ turnover to other industries. It takes very long time of several decades from 
R&D to decommissioning of weapon system, so it is very necessary for unpredictable 
emergency to maintain capacity utilization rate and expertise related to the weapon.  
Moreover, defense exports mean increase of arms with interoperability. BIS(2007) 
cited that “exports… promote interoperability of weapon systems between the United States 
and allied countries”(p. 3-1). Especially because indirect offset trade provides military-related 
things except the military article referenced in the main contact, one indirect offsets means 
more than two common weapons between trade partners. In international scale of war, 
interoperability between allies help combined operation because they know well the friends. 
Thus, it is possible to say that the military offset trade ultimately has positive effect on the 
national defense.  
By contrast, the defense offsets can affect adversely the national security because of 
yielding foreign source dependency. Weida(1986) stated that “offsets … could result in more 
foreign source dependency at the subcontractor level”(p. 6) which “affects the ability to 
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sustain weapon production in time of war”(p119). Domestic subcontractors and lower-tier 
suppliers can be displaced by the offset arrangement, and an exporting country’s dependency 
on foreign source is intensified. Therefore, impact of excessive offsets on defense 
preparedness is negative, negating effect of increasing exports. 
On the one hand, some kinds of compensating method and trade with specific nations 
are in particular harmful to defense preparedness. Especially, subcontracting has directly 
adverse effect on defense preparedness by displacing domestic subcontractors and lower-tier 
supplier. Co-production, licensed production and purchases negatively act to national defense 
indirectly by affecting adversely a seller’s economy. In addition, co-production and 
subcontracting are the representative direct offsets that developed trade partners hope, while 
the purchases, which have relatively small effect on national defense, are indirect offsets that 
LDCs desire. 
Consequently, effect of the military offset trade on defense preparedness is different 
according to compensating method, and the trade partner. Direct offsets are relatively bad for 
that, and offsets with a developed nation are also worse to that. 
 
5. IMPACTS OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
In the past, perspectives on impacts of the technology transfer were significantly 
negative for an exporting country. Majority considered its negative ripple effects on 
employment, balance of trade, the defense industry and the defense preparedness in the future 
rather than immediate impacts on those. Thus, for an exporter, the technology transfer as an 
offset trade was regarded as a myopic transaction that sacrifices bigger business in the future 
for current small interest by nurturing enemies. OTA(1991) cited that “over the past two 
decades, these [technology transfer] arrangements have contributed to the emergence of new 
centers of advanced defense industry and technology, first in Europe, next in Western Pacific, 
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and increasingly in developing nations around the globe”(p. 25). Especially, developing 
countries and LDCs, which received the technology, were expected to grow rapidly, based on 
cheaper wage rate and raw materials. Mirus and Yeung(1989) stated : 
The transferor does not have any meaningful ownership control of the technology 
and the manufacturing facilities which the technology helps to construct. Equipped 
with an advanced technology and inexpensive local inputs, the transferee may 
become a competitor to be reckoned with.(p. 34) 
Development of other nations means that many sellers come in the world arms market, and 
competition has become fierce which lowers price of arms and each firm’s profit. While Co-
production, subcontract, licensed production displace subcontractors and lower-tier suppliers 
of an exporting country, the technology transfer would injury all including even prime 
contractors. As a result, the technology transfer will erode overall the defense industry and 
employment of an exporting country. 
In addition, from pessimists’ standpoint, the technology transfer as indirect offset trade, 
which provide civilian-oriented or commercial technology, does not impact on a transferor’s 
defense industry and its employment, but negatively affects other industries and their jobs. 
Lumpe(1994) argued that “by assisting foreign industries with U.S. commercial technology 
and access to the U.S. market, indirect offsets have the effect of supporting jobs in the arms 
industry at the cost of commercial employment over the long run”. In other word, indirect 
offsets, especially the technology transfer, which developed a seller’s defense industry 
through growing exports, eroded own commercial industries. The reason was explained by 
Brauer, who stated that “for offsets to carry a genuine economic impact, world demand for 
the underlying products must be increased, [but] world demand for commercial product is 
hurt, not helped, by extra military expenditure”(2004, 60). Thus, the technology transfer also 
hurt commercial industries and their jobs. 
As result of appearance of competitor in the world arms market and even world 
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commercial market, a seller’s trade balance would be affected adversely. In other word, the 
technology transfer adversely affects both the defense and civil industries. It is a big 
differential when comparing to coproduction, subcontract, licensed production, and purchase. 
Coproduction, subcontract, and licensed production nearly impact on just the defense industry. 
Purchase affects negatively just the civil industry. 
In addition, the evidence that the technology transfer is harmful to an exporting 
country’s defense preparedness was suggested. Lumpe(1994) cited that “Israeli arms 
manufacturers have illegally incorporated U.S. designs and technology into their weapons 
and exported them to countries the U.S. would not sell to for human rights or foreign policy 
reasons”. It means that military technology illegally transferred can be used in manufacturing 
weapons of enemies that can threaten the original owner. 
 
However, according to opponent studies, some of them are exaggerated too much and 
suspect. Rather, selling or transferring a certain technology is likely to be more profitable for 
an exporting firm or country. In this case, what matter is when and which technology is 
transferred or sold. Weida(1986) stated: 
[technology is] a perishable commodity... If [a firm] holds the technology too long, 
it will be worthless. If it sells or trades the technology too soon, it will ruin its 
competitive advantage. And, when it exchanges the technology at the correct time, 
it may lose a little, but it will gain greater benefits than it has loses. (p. 143) 
In addition, regarding a kind of the technology, Storer(1987, 12) stated that firms “tend to 
give away only those technologies which they can afford to give away, not ‘patented’ high 
technology”. Schaffer(1989) also insisted that firms tend to transfer only technology expected 
to go out of fashion in the near future. In addition to that, Brauer(2004) noted : 
technology transfer provide an opportunity to dispose of technology that is on the 
verge of being outdated. Offset receiving countries recognize this and can partially 
protect themselves if they negotiate buy-back deals(which obligates the technology 
exporting country to buy-back product made with the transferred technology). Still, 
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an outdated technology combined with low-cost labor might make a buy-back deal 
attractive to the offering firm. (p. 60) 
In other word, transferor can get another benefit through buy-back. In sum, firms sell or 
transfer the technology even in the arms market, and what matter is the timing and the kind. 
Furthermore, while majority believe that a compensation practice is free, some studies 
have showed the opposite. Han and Lee(1998) argued that the price determined by an offset 
agreement goes up by less than 10% than original price. Markusen also stated that the 
administrative cost of offsets “is currently running between 7 and 10 percent of the value of 
the arms sale”(2004, 71), and Brauer and Dunne believe that “this cost must be recovered in 
some form”(2005, 21). The cost can increase more than other offsets, because of difficulty of 
the technology transfer such as searching for stable technologies, training foreign firms’ 
engineers and etc. Therefore, value of technology transferred as a compensation practice is 
actually not free, though it may be cheaper than the technology directly purchased. 
Above all, the most doubtful issue is that the technology transferred, especially to 
LDCs, will make potential a competitor, effectively contributing to development of a 
transferee’s defense industry. Brauer argued that “the exporting country will further develop 
its technological prowess, once more leaving the receiving country behind” and creating 
effective competition(2004, 60). For example, despite the U.S. “encourages the transfer of 
production technology to NATO and major Non-NATO allies”(Lumpe, 1994), “the U.S. 
technology lead is widening, not narrowing”(Brauer, 2004, 60). Moreover, LDCs’ domestic 
industrial condition is not suitable to develop the defense industry. According to Heckscher-
Olihn Theorem10, Developing countries and LDCs do not have comparative advantage in the 
defense industry, which has become capital-intensive as weapons have been modernized or 
mechanized. Brauer(2004) explained their limited potential as follow: 
                                            
10 It say that the labor abundant country has comparative advantage in the labor intensive 
good, and the capital abundant country has comparative advantage in capital intensive good. 
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It is not actual arms production that creates the potential, but the potential that 
permits actual arms production. A country’s arms production potential depends on 
the state of its human and physical capital. … developing nations do not posses the 
requisite capital, neither to engage in arms production nor arms coproduction, and 
that technology transfer and training do not transfer this capital in a self-sustaining 
manner. These capabilities apparently cannot be imported; they need to be grown 
indigenously. (p. 60) 
It says that it is possible for transferee to be a competitor against a seller only after 
accumulating sufficient capital. The fact that LDCs are unfamiliar with the technology 
transferred makes assimilation of the technology more difficult. It is like teaching an infant a 
differential equation prior to spelling. Thus, an exporting country does not need to worry too 
seriously about nurturing future enemy in the world arms market by transferring the military 
technology. 
Another suspicious issue is regarding quality of the technology transferred as a 
compensation practice. BIS(2007) stated :  
The cutting edge or nascent technologies under development in U.S. R&D 
activities may be less likely to be transferred to foreign companies in fulfillment of 
offset obligations than older technologies. Regardless, any transfer of export-
controlled technology must be approved through the U.S. Government’s normal 
export licensing process. The existence of an offset obligation provides no 
circumvention of the established licensing process for the U.S. Departments of 
Commerce and State to rule on applications for the transfer of sensitive technology. 
(p. 3-5) 
It means that a transferee should indigenously develop the technology transferred, because 
stated-of-the-art technology would not be transferred. The old technology transferred can be 
only stepping stone to develop more advanced that. Otherwise, an importing country must 
constantly import technologies, and even if it succeeds in developing the technology, 
technological dependency is still not removed completely. Chinworth found that Taiwanese 
“efforts to develop indigenous systems in the 1990s resulted in items that remained heavily 
dependent on imported technology; not all domestic development program were 
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successful”(2004, 246) Furthermore, an importing country should apply the technology 
obtained, which may be specific to only a certain arms, to another production. Utilization in 
large range is just economy of scale that lowers marginal cost, and a transferee should 
develop the technology for this larger utilization. Thus, without technological base, utilization 
of the technology transferred is restricted. 
As counterarguments, some examples that transferees succeeded in advancing their 
own defense industries are suggested. However, their developments were caused by only the 
technology transfer. Brizinger stated “Singapore’s defense industry appears to be thriving, 
largely because of its core competencies/niche production business strategy”(Brauer & 
Dunne, 2004, 16). According to Brauer and Dunne, Brazil’s success in the technology 
transfer was “achieved through massive government investment and subsidy and Brazil is 
still nowhere near having fully autonomous arms production in any sector”(2004, 15). South 
Africa’ defense industrial capacity could be exploited due to equity investment linked to arms 
purchases from European governments, joint ventures with European firms, and due to 
becoming a part of the European’s global supply chains, rather than the technology 
transfer(Brauer & Lamb, 2004). In order to develop the defense industry, an importing 
country needs not only advanced technology, but comprehensive complex comprising an 
effective macroeconomic policy, governmental subsidy, massive investment, and etc. 
Therefore, it is hard to, in whole, deny contribution of the technology to competitors’ 
development, but the technology transfer is not main reason of that. 
As above noted, the technology transfer cannot be the main reason of competitors’ arise 
in the world arms market. In other word, offering technology is not much harmful to an 
exporting country’s defense industry, when compared to compensating methods such as co-
production, subcontract, and licensed production. 
Moreover, non-military technology transfer as an indirect offset trade does not 
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contribute to arise in non-defense industries. Brauer and Dunne cited that “the experience 
with civilian-oriented technology transfers appears to be worse than the examples with 
military-offset technology transfers”(2004, 15). Thus, it is hard to say that non-military 
technology transfer as an indirect offset trade makes competitors in the world non-military 
markets, and reduces overall domestic employment and trade balance. 
Rather, it is a great measure to reduce actual value of a compensating practice. As 
earlier noted, one of mitigating the trade balance reduced by offsetting measure is a multiplier. 
GAO(1998) noted : 
From the contractors’ perspective, the technology transfers are often a relatively 
inexpensive way to earn offset credit because, in some cases, the contractors 
already possess the technology the foreign government desires. In most cases, the 
value of technology transfer is negotiated between the U.S. contractor and the 
foreign government. The negotiated value of the technology is often based on the 
contractor’s prior investment in research and development, the market value of the 
technology, … Multiples of the negotiated value are also used, depending on the 
value the foreign government places on certain types of technology. (p. 6) 
In other word, because the original market value and excess value caused by desire of an 
importing country are combined, the credit value of the technology is bigger than actual value. 
As a result, an exporter can compensate less than actual value, through the technology 
transfer, and it contributes to balanced trade of an exporting nation. 
Consequently, dislike vague expectation of pessimists, the technology transfer is not 
harmful to an exporting country compared with co-production, subcontractor, licensed 
production, and counterpurchase. Rather it can be a useful tool in mitigating adverse impacts 
caused by an offset arrangement. Thus, South Korea, as an emerging seller in the world arms 
market, should break passive attitude to offsets. 
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Ⅳ. FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS OF OFFSET AGREEMENT 
 
 
As noted in the chapter Ⅲ, overall impacts of offsets including the technology transfer 
are not always bad for an exporter, and rather those can be beneficial by raising exports. For 
this reason, South Korea needs to actively make an offset agreement. Then, which factors 
affects success of making an offset agreement? 
Before searching the factors affecting success of offset agreement, correctly defining 
the ‘success of an offset agreement’ from a seller’s perspective is required. The term “offsets” 
is generally used, but precisely speaking, an offset trade and an offset agreement are not same. 
While South Korea uses the term an “offset trade” without any distinction, the U.S. divides 
offsets into an offset agreement and an offset transaction. BIS stated that offset agreements 
are to “enter into between the U.S. firms and [foreign trade partners] in connection with 
contracts for the sale of U.S.-origin defense items”, and offset transactions are “to satisfy 
these offset agreements”(2009, i-ii). Thus, South Korea’s an “offset trade” is similar to an 
offset transaction, rather than an offset agreement. 
Without the distinction, there are only a few efforts to define the success of offsets. 
Ianakiev and Mladenov(2009) stated : 
The success of offset policies as an instrument for overcoming barriers to the 
establishment of transborder industrial relations resides in the incentives that they 
provide for searching for local partners in the importer’s economy. These 
incentives result from the conditioning of the core contract to the acceptance of the 
offset obligation; refusing to establish relations with local suppliers implies losing 
the profits obtained through the main contract. (p. 9) 
Their statement is limited to mainly subcontract production among several compensating 
methods. On the other hand, Kremer and Sain(1992) defined successful offsets as “the 
[development or] implementation (phase 1) and execution (phase 2) of an offset agreement in 
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such a manner that all parties to the agreement are satisfied with the results”(p. 32). They 
pointed out ‘final signed agreement’ in phase 1 and ‘fulfilling the terms of the agreement’ in 
phase 2 as indications of each party’s satisfaction(1992). In other word, because trade 
partners do not know result of an offset trade in advance, they make an agreement at a point 
where they feel satisfaction simultaneously and implement the agreement, expecting each 
own successful offset trade. Though Kremer and Sain defined “offsets”, its meaning has 
“success of an offset agreement” under these distinct definitions. Thus, this paper will follow 
the definition by Kremer and Sain in defining success of an offset agreement.  
Along with the definition, Kremer and Sain(1992) drew 20 factors that affect success 
of an offset agreement by reviewing studies on offsets, countertrade, international joint 
venture and international cooperative projects, and then classified those into 4 groups related 
to buyer, seller, contract and product. 
 
1. FACTORS RELATED TO BUYERS 
As factors related to buyers, Kremer and Sain(1992) indicated 5 factors such as 
international experience, not being viewed as a competitor, technical experience, sufficient 
financial resources, and stable environment. 
An importing country’s experience decides its attitude in making agreements and 
executing mandates. Lecraw stated that “countertrade is more successful, the greater the 
importer’s countertrade experience”(1989, 51). Kremer and Sain cited that international 
offset experience is “concerned … more specifically with the amount of experience with 
offset deal”(1992, 84-85). Regarding this, Mirus and Yeung(1989) gave an example that a 
Chinese firm, which wanted to import technology to produce ethylene diamine and had not 
experienced any international negotiation, were interested in protecting itself from the risk. 
Like the case, less international experience of an importer can be connected to its passivity.  
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Whether an importer is viewed as a competitor or not is as critical as its experience. 
Mirus and Yeung(1989) cited that “a final worry of the [technology] transferor is that the 
transferee will become a competitor in the future”(p. 34). For this reason, Jacques Rostain, 
vice president of Combustion Engineering Trading Inc., said that “it is critical for successful 
countertrading to handle products that are ‘noncompetitive and complementary’ to [a seller’s] 
own products”(Kremer & Sain, 1992, 33). Thus, an exporting country or firm will not make 
an offset agreement with a country that is considered as a potential competitor in the world 
arms market. 
An importer’s technical experience is one success criteria of offsets, too. “The 
availability of local country expertise” acts as the key elements of any offset(Weida, 1986, 
81), and Kremer and Sain specified the variable as “the degree which the foreign company 
has experience with the relevant technology”(1992, 85). Mirus and yeung argued that 
“absenteeism, low productivity, and unsatisfactory workmanship of the local labor force” are 
the problems for a technology transferring firm(1989, 34).  
The sufficient financial resources of an importing country are also important condition 
of successful offset agreement. However, Kremer and Sain(1992) said that it is hard to decide 
how to estimate the criteria. Instead, they utilized a change in GNP growth rate during recent 
5 years of an importing country as indirect index. Because client is a country in the world 
arms market, its growth rate could indirectly show its availability of financial resources, 
premising that at least growing nations seldom go to bankruptcy.   
A stable environment in an importing country and its relation with an exporting country 
are also important for a successful offset agreement. Kremer and Sain(1992) specified a 
buyer’s stability into four variables, which contains the internal economic-, political- and 
social stability, and the treat from external entity. Especially, economic instability can be 
connected to public opinion which opposes procurement of the arms. 
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2. FACTORS RELATED TO SELLERS  
As factors related to sellers, study by Kremer and Sain(1992) explained 7 factors such 
as compatible goals, proactive strategy, in-house offset group, top management support, 
commitment to project, international experience, and large company. 
Compatible goals are regarded as a prerequisite for success of offsets. Verzariu said 
that successful offsets is determined by “the matching of … commercial objectives”(Kremer 
& Sain, 1992, 36). According to specific explanation by Kremer and Sain, each trade partner 
should “accomplish its goals without hindering the ability of the other party to meet its own 
goals”(1992, p 88). In other word, each goal doesn’t need to be same, but should be 
compatible. 
A proactive strategy was suggested for a seller’s voluntary attitude in making an offset 
agreement. Kremer and Sain(1992) explained the variable more in detail as “attempts by the 
seller to anticipate and plan for offsets, and actively seek out projects which could be used to 
fulfill current or future offset obligation”(p. 89). Weida(1986) emphasized “operating in a 
pro-active mode in the future”, stating that “to maximize the benefits [both to a buyer] and to 
the company selling the weapons[,] … this could only be done through a great deal of 
advance planning”(p. 159). Regarding the role of a proactive strategy, Neale, Sercu, and 
Shipley(1992) noted that “a proactive strategy embodies determined scanning for profitable 
countertrade opportunities.. [and], increases countertrade effectiveness and profitability”(p. 
308). Thus, Kremer and Sain (1992) argued that despite of mandatory offsets, a proactive 
strategy allows flexibility and control in the negotiation, and finally contribute to success of 
an offset agreement. 
For a proactive strategy, an in-house offset group is required. Neale, Sercu, and 
Shipley(1992) stated: 
… effective organization is critical to countertrade success. Three key 
organizational principles apply. First, … Second, since all countertrade deals 
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involve some unique characteristics, flexibility is required so that relevant 
expertise can be incorporated to meet specific needs. Third, since countertrade 
involves many complex dimensions, the organization needs to include personnel 
drawn from several functions,[such as] finance, legal, technical, production, quality 
control, distribution and sales as well as marketing. (p. 308) 
In other word, an effective organization with diverse expertise is critical for success of offsets. 
In addition, in-house group will be better, because recruiting “relevant service suppliers 
externally… may dilute confidentiality” (Neale, Sercu, & Shipley, 1992, 308). Especially, 
since weapon trading is concerned with national security, the group should be in-house rather 
than outside.  
For a proactive strategy, the top management support is also needed. Neale, Sercu, and 
Shipley(1992) asserted that “top management support is required to inspire an appropriate 
countertrade culture within the company”(p. 307). They viewed the variable as first one of 
three elements for effective organization, citing “there is a need for a clearly-defined chief co-
ordinator of countertrade activity to provide accountability, authority and leadership”(1992, 
308). 
Commitment to the project is also related to proactive strategy. Neale, Sercu, and 
Shipley(1992) argued that “top management responsibilities should demonstrate enthusiasm 
for countertrade”(p. 307). As a role of the variable, Kremer and Sain(1992) stated that this is 
related to “activities which show that the seller is actively interested in the successful 
completion of the project”(p. 90). It makes a buyer have credibility on a seller’s willingness 
to make or execute the agreement. 
Even a seller’ experience is an important variable for success of offset agreements. 
Lecraw said that “countertrade is more successful, the greater the producer’s export and 
countertrade experience”(1989, 51). It is because “frequent countertrade involvement 
generates scale and experience economy, ... [and] also creates a reputation for willingness to 
participate that attracts repeat business from proactive customers and builds a network of 
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contracts for profitable product disposal”(Neale, Sercu, & Shipley,1992, 308). 
The next variable related to a seller is its size. Lecraw(1989) stated that “for large firms 
selling high-value, complex products, countertrade success was higher than for small firms 
selling low value, standardized products”(p. 55). The advantage of larger seller is caused by 
its “sourcing(purchasing) capability”, “more capital for investment schemes and a richer 
variety of technologies to choose from in transferring technology under an offset 
requirement”(Shaffer, 1989, 8-9). Thus, a larger firm can succeed in an offset agreement than 
smaller one. 
 
3. FACTORS RELATED TO THE CONTRACT  
As factors related to the contract, Kremer and Sain(1992) indicated 5 factors which 
include transferability of obligations, dual contracts, the size of the sales, a long payback 
period, and low penalties.  
Transferability of obligations should be stipulated in the contract document. Weida 
asserted that “any properly negotiated offset contract will contain… assignability of 
contract”(1986, 78-80). There are some entities related to the military offset agreement, 
which could influence on execution of the obligation. For example, the prime contractor 
could not execute the mandates due to non-fulfillment of any subcontractor who may be a 
local or foreigner. Thus, the variable is stipulated as a contingency plan. 
Kremer and Sain(1992) emphasized “the importance of using separate contracts for the 
sale of the goods and the offset or countertrade obligation” which allows better “flexibility in 
financing and payments”(p. 42). Their study founded dual contracts are needed for “the 
different time frames for the obligations”(1992, 41). For this reason, “Offset Program 
Guidelines” published Korean DAPA(2008b) stipulates uses of “main contract”, “Offset 
Memorandum of Understanding(MOU)”, and “Offset Memorandum of Agreement(MOA)” 
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respectively. 
The size of sale is another contract-related variable. Lecraw(1989) asserted that 
“countertrade is more successful, the larger the size of each sale”(p. 51). According to 
Kremer and Sain(1992), the larger sales are more attractive to the trade partners than smaller 
ones, both “because of the amount of time and effort involved in negotiating, implementing 
and administrating an offset proposal,”(p. 91-92), and because of that “there is as much time 
and energy spent on negotiating small contracts as there is on large contract”(p. 43). For this 
reason, countries are regulating the minimum contract value in trading arms where they begin 
to require the offset agreement(Brauer & Dunne, 2004). In other word, an offset trade is 
unlikely to occur in the sales of less than minimum value.  
A long payback period is also contract-related variable. Kremer and Sain(1992) cited 
“a longer timeframe to allow more flexibility [for a seller]”(p. 43). It is closely related to the 
inflation rate or the time-discount rate. Although nominal value of compensation is fixed, 
actual value of that would constantly decline as payback time becomes long. 
Low penalty is the last contract-related variable. Almost the military offset 
arrangements include a provision that regulates a penalty of a exporter who does not fulfill 
obligation, and sometimes it can be excluded from future potential trade(Brauer & Dunne, 
2004). If the penalty rate is high, a seller will take a risk not to be penalized even in 
contingency. Therefore, low penalty allows a seller’s flexibility in reacting to unexpected 
incidents. 
 
4. FACTORS RELATED TO THE PRODUCT  
As factors related to the product, Kremer and Sain(1992) founded 3 factors, mature 
technology, complexity or uniqueness of product, and a high visibility of product.  
Mature technology is product-related variable. Kremer and Sain(1992) considered 
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aspects of both “the product being sold” and “the technology being transferred in the offset 
agreement”(p. 93). In case of technology transfer, the technology transferred should be 
properly well-developed in order to attract consumers, but should not be state-of-the-art. 
Complexity or uniqueness of product is also product-related factor. Lecraw asserted 
that “countertrade is more successful, the more complex the export product”(1989, 51). The 
army should always consider “METT-TC11”, which is unique according to a country’s 
environment. The METT-TC determines Required Operational Capability(ROC), which 
product should meet of an importing country. Therefore, a consumer would select the 
weapons with uniqueness suitable for its ROC. 
A high visibility of product is also cited as a product-related factor. Lecraw(1989) 
asserted that “countertrade is more successful, the higher the ‘visibility’ of the export product 
in the importing country”(p. 51). Kremer and Sain(1992) stated that a high visibility would 
imply conceived requirement for the product exists in an importing country, therefore, the 
seller is at the advantage than the consumer in negotiation. This variable would be considered 
in terms of both “the visibility of the end product” within an importing country and “the 
visibility of the selection process”(Kremer & Sain, 1992, 94-95). 
 
In sum, these 20 factors affecting success of an offset agreement are exhibited in the 
table 6. The exhibition order is not what reveals the importance level of each factor in making 
an offset agreement. The success does not require all the factors, and there are relatively more 
critical variables. Those can be known by analyzing actual case later. 
 
 
 
                                            
11 Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops available, Time available, Civilian 
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Category Factors Affecting Success of Offset Agreement 
Factors related 
to Buyer 
International experience(countertrade or especially offsets) 
Not being viewed as a competitor 
Technical experience 
Sufficient financial resources 
Stable environment(economic, political, social, security-related) and 
relationship with a exporting country 
Factors related 
to Seller 
Compatible goals(not same) 
Proactive strategy 
In-house offset group 
Top management support 
Commitment to project 
International experience 
Size of seller 
Factors related 
to Contract 
Transferability of obligations 
Dual contracts(main contract and MOU or MOA) 
The size of the sales 
Long payback period 
Low penalties 
Factors related  
to Product 
Mature technology 
Complexity or uniqueness of product 
High visibility of product 
Table 6: Factors Affecting Success of Offset Agreement (Kremer&Sain, 1992) with author’s 
own adjustment 
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V. CASE ANAYSIS OF THE K-9 SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY EXPORT TO TURKEY 
 
 
In the previous chapters, research on success factors and impacts of offsets, especially 
the technology transfer were conducted. From now on, this paper examines what were found 
in the previous chapters through a case study. Case of the K-9 export to Turkey is the most 
suitable for this study which is searching the effects and influence factors of offsets, since 
those of the exports can be known more easily than other Korean cases. The K-9 Thunder, 
Korean new self-propelled artillery Project was aiming at its exportation even at the initial 
planning period. The K-9 export to Turkey was the biggest sales Korea has ever undertaken, 
and enough time to observe valid impacts has passed.  
This chapter will review the Turkey, South Korean and the K-9 Thunder. After that, it 
will analyze the impacts on employment, trade balance, the defense industry and the defense 
preparedness, and finally pick out the success factors regarding a buyer, a seller, the contract 
and the product.  
 
1. THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  
This study will give an outline of Turkey in order to help understanding a consumer of 
the K-9 self-propelled artillery. The outline will focus on events, situation and etc. 
specifically in 1999 ~ 2001 when Korea bid on Turkish new self-propelled artillery business 
and succeed in making an offset agreement with Turkey. 
 
1.1. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
Turkey, which officially called the Republic of Turkey, lies from Anatolian peninsula in 
the Middle East Asia to Trace in Balkan of Southeastern Europe, thus it has played a role of 
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intersection where Asia and Europe or Islam, Catholicism and Christian contact. Anatolian 
peninsula accounts for 97%, Trace region accounts for the rest, 3%. Turkey shares border 
with eight countries including Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria from Northwest to South. Its capital is Ankara(Ministry of Foreign Affair and Trade, 
2005). 
 
Figure 6: The Map of the Republic of Turkey(Embassy of the Republic of 
Korea in the Republic of Turkey, 2010) 
Population of Turkey is about 70 millions, of which ethnic Turks account for 90%, and 
the rest is comprised of about 10 millions of Kurds, 360 thousands of Arabs, and Armenians, 
Greeks, and Jewish people. Almost people is Muslim and its official language is Turkish 
which belongs to Ural-Altaic to which Korean also does(Ministry of Foreign Affair and Trade, 
2005).  
As a result of defeat at the World War І, Turkey lost almost territory except Anatolian 
plateau and parts of Constantinople. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who has been called as the 
Atatürk which means father of Turkey, led the Turkish national movement. Under Kemal 
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Pasha’ leadership, Turkey expelled Greek army in Trace peninsula in 1922, and finally 
succeeded in recovering almost Anatolian peninsula. Kemal Pasha became the first president 
of the Republic of Turkey, and he reformed the republic, implementing the western style of 
modernization policies(MOFAT, 2005). 
Turkey participated was on the side of the U.S.A against the U.S.S.R. in the Cold War. 
It took a part of the Korean War in 1950, and joined in the NATO in 1952. In late 1950s, the 
deficits of budget and trade became worse, and political suppression and religious tendency 
got intensified. Finally, a military coup occurred in 1960, and the military regime peacefully 
transferred the power to the parliament formed in 1961(MOFAT, 2005). 
Currently, Turkish government can be regarded as basically the parliamentary system, 
which contains some characteristics of the presidential system. The Parliament selects the 
president, and the President appoints the Prime Minister, who charges for the practical 
Executive power. Except the third president Celal Bayar in 1950 ~ 1960, all president from 
the first to the sixth in 1923 ~ 1980 had been ex-servicemen, but since 1980 civilians has 
became the president and in 2000 Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court, became the 10th president. He pursued revision of human right and democratization as 
the “Secularism” policy in order to join Turkey to the EU. Selecting the leader of majority 
party as the Prime Minister is the Turkish political tradition. However, since 1990 Turkish 
political situation has been unstable, and majority party has changed seven times. In 1999 ~ 
2002, Democratic Left party, which has the middle left tendency and was led by Bülent 
Ecevit, formed the coalition government with the National Action Party and the Motherland 
Party(MOFAT, 2005). Conflict between the President Sezer and the Prime Minister Ecevit 
made the its political situation more unstable(Korea Eximbank, 2005). 
Furthermore, Turkish economic situation was much more unsecure. Before 1970s, 
Turkish economy had been the agriculture-based self-sufficient system, and its government 
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had frequently intervened in the economy. Since 1980s, the government turned its economic 
policy to market-friendly one, but in 1994 faced financial crisis because of budget deficit 
caused by political interests and surge of national debt. In 1994 its economic growth rate was 
-6.0 %, and since 1990s inflation rate has been more than 50%. Budget deficit and national 
debt has been constantly accumulated. As a result of that, Turkey got bailout from the IMF 
under conditions of social welfare reform, revision of governmental budget, reform of 
financial market, improvement of transparency in public area and etc. Nevertheless, the 
promise of some reforms was not implemented well, and budget deficit and insolvency of 
financial institutions were intensified. Finally, in February 2001, Turkey confronted 
historically the most serious financial crisis, and in February 2002, IMF gave $16 billion of 
bailout under condition of more severe reforms. Anyway, 2001 was economically the worst 
year for Turkey, reporting -9.4% of GNP growth rate, 68.5% of consumer price increase rate, 
and 88.6% of wholesale price increase rate(MOFAT, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 7: Trends of Turkey’s Economic Growth and Inflation(Korea Eximbank, 2005) 
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Figure 8: Trend of Turkey’s Federal Budget Deficit(Korea Eximbank, 2005) 
 
Political and economic unrest made even social atmosphere uneasy. Workers of 
agriculture, who account for 12% of GDP and 35% of employment, were unsatisfied with the 
reform ideology that the government had pursued(MOFAT, 2005). 
 
The country that has made conflicts with Turkey is mainly Greece. Malice between two 
has been caused by problems regarding arming of Greek islands, the continental shelf, Flight 
Information Regions, the territorial waters, sovereignty over Kardak island, and etc. 
Especially, the secession problem of the North Cyprus derived from rooted conflict between 
Turkey and Greece. In Cyprus Turkish people account for 23%, and Greek people do 77%, 
and conflicts and crashes between two races have continued. In 1974 Turkey dispatched 40 
thousands of troops to Cyprus and conquered its northern area. North Cyprus declared the 
independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus(TRNC) with Turkey’s assistance. 
Despite many efforts to make an agreement regarding federation or reunification, parties have 
not succeeded in doing that(MOFAT, 2005). 
On the one hand, relationship between South Korea and Turkey is very good. Turkish 
some traditions are similar to Korean’s ones. Turkish government and majority of people 
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regard South Korea as the “blood alliance”. In the Korean War, Turkey sent a 14,936 strong 
of troops, and reported 721 killed, 2,147 injured, 175 missed, and etc.(MOFAT, 2005).  
Especially, Turkey has been interested in Korean economic development, so-called the 
“Miracle of Han River”, and wants to learn the know-how. After visiting Korea of the 
president Evren in 1982, exchange and visiting between two countries have been done several 
times. However, trades between two are not balanced. While South Korea exported $1.2 
billion in 2000 and $0.7 billion in 2001 to Turkey, Turkey did $50 million in 2000 and $130 
million in 2001 to South Korea. Exports of Korea to Turkey has been manufacturing goods, 
but exports of Turkey to South Korea have consisted of agricultural goods and raw materials. 
Furthermore, South Korea has made almost no investment in Turkey(MOFAT, 2005). 
 
1.2 MILTARY AND OFFSETS POLICY 
Because of frequent troubles with Greece and its geopolitical position, Turkey has 
attempted to expedite increase of armament. While gradually reducing its scale from 580 
thousand to 425 thousand, Turkey is promoting own troops’ mechanization and 
modernization(MOFAT, 2005). 
Turkish parliament ratified Defense Industry Law(Law no. 3238) in 1985 in order to 
develop a national defense industry and implement offsets regarding the defense 
acquisition(Cakir, Tezcan & Zorluoglu, 2008, 51). Especially, the law stipulated that 
“domestic suppliers should be facilitated to maximum extent practicable for foreign arms 
procurements, pointing to offsets” (Cakir, Tezcan & Zorluoglu, 2008). Pursuant to the law, 
the five main offsets organizations are established; “the Defense Industry Executive 
Committee, Undersecretariat for Defense Industries[(SSM– the Turkish acronym)], the 
Defense Industry Support Fund, Defense Industry High Coordination Council, and Defense 
Industry Control Committee”(Cakir, Tezcan & Zorluoglu, 2008). $10 billion of fund to 
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modernize the army was also financed(MOFAT, 2005).  
The Defense Industry Executive Committee, which is composed of the Prime Minister 
as a head, the Chief of General Staff12, and the Minister of Defense, makes main decisions 
related to defense industrial issues and major weapon acquisition project(Cakir et al., 2008, 
51). The mission of the SSM that implement “decision of the Defense Industry Executive 
Committee” is “to meet the requirement of the Turkish Armed Forces and the government 
organizations that promote national defense, and to establish and implement strategy and 
procedures for development of the defense industry”(Cakir et al., 2008, 51-52). 
Gencturk13 argued that purpose of Turkey’s offsets policy has changed gradually, 
which could be distinguished into 3 categories; “1st period, 1984 to 2000” when “offsets were 
implemented as a tool of financing”, “2nd period, 2000 to 2007” when “offsets were 
implemented to develop the national defense industry base”, and “3rd period, from 2007” 
when “offsets were implemented to increase the competitive power of Turkish defense 
industry and to reach the strategic goals of SSM”(Cakir et al., 2008, 53). 
During 1st period from 1984 to 2000, the main purpose of offsets was to secure foreign 
financing for the acquisition business. “Offset Handbook” published by the SSM in 1991 
stated: 
… to provide foreign currency through exporting defense products and the other 
related industrial products, and foreign capital investments, consequently; to 
recover foreign currency flowing out because of the procurement to maximum 
extent possible. (Cakir et al., 2008, 53) 
In other word, fostering its own defense industry was not yet a main purpose. Indirect offsets 
were prevailing than direct offsets because for Turkey, a nation having a non-developed 
defense industry, it is not realistic to require direct offsets such as high technology(Cakir et al., 
                                            
12 The actual commander of the Turkish Armed Forces. He is superior to even the Minister 
of Defense, and command line of Turkish army is orderly the president, the prime minister, 
the Chief of General Staff(MOFAT, 2005). 
13 “Hasan Gencturk is the author of ‘Offsets in Defense Industries’ thesis of expertise for 
SSM in 1989, which is the first study in this area in Turkey”(Cakir et al., 2008, 51). 
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2008). For this reason, Offset Handbook of 1991 implied that “even if technology transfers 
and foreign investments [are] directed towards development of the national defense industry, 
they are treated as indirect offsets”. Actually, these transactions were regarded as lower 
priority(Cakir et al., 2008, 58). 
During 2nd period from 2000 to 2007, the main purpose of offsets policy was to foster 
its own defense industry. “Industrial Participation & Offset Directive” of 2003 published by 
SSM stated that the purpose was “… to increase the capacity and capabilities as well as to 
increase the market share and the competitive power of the national defense industry in the 
international market”(Cakir et al., 2008, 55). SSM reduced the burden of a buyer by easing 
requirement if the buyer met more than 51% of local content. Multipliers were given to 
technology transfer, and nevertheless the technology transfer was still difficult for Turkey. 
For this reason, “technology transfer, license, R&D, and joint ventures were still regarded as 
indirect offsets”(Cakir et al., 2008, 58). The recognition was reflected on “Offset Directive” 
published by SSM in 2000 as follows: 
If a foreign company transfers technology or contracts for R&D activities with a 
Turkish company, that company is obliged to pay back 50% of the offset 
transaction (before multipliers are applied) without interest to Defense Industry 
Support Fund in USD or Euros in a 5 year period. Even though this regulation was 
intended to provide a method for Turkish companies to assess the value and quality 
of technology transfer, this regulation discouraged technology transfers in practice. 
(Cakir et al., 2008, 59) 
In other world, the technology transfer was not regarded as prior one. Thus, technology 
transfers were classified into Category Four, while exporting goods and services produced by 
Turkish defense industry belonged to Category One14(Cakir et al., 2008). 
 
Turkey has many offset experience as an importing country. Until December 2008, 
                                            
14 “Industrial Participation & Offset Directive” of 2003 set 4 categories according to each 
priority(Cakir et al., 2008). 
65 
 
Turkey completed 22 transactions, and 55 transactions were in progress(Cakir et al., 2008). 
Among them, F-16 procurement was the most representative one. Turkey agreed with 
General Dynamics on purchasing 160 F-16 aircrafts and coproducing 152 out of all 160 in 
Turkey. In addition, indirect offsets compensated by GD were approximately $800 million 
investing in the local thermal power plant and hotel industry. Total worth of the offsets was 
$1 billion, 25% of the main contract(Schaffer, 1989). Lately, Turkey has conducted other 
forms of offsets such as a joint venture. A consortium including Turkey requested A400M 
Transport Aircraft Project in 1997, and made a single contract in 2003 which would provide 7 
European nations of the consortium with 180 aircrafts. Turkey planed to procure 10 aircrafts, 
which account for 5.56% out of 180. Without traditional offsets, Turkish defense firm was 
responsible for 5.56% work-share under control of SSM which is mainly about sub-assembly, 
participating even in design and development. As a result of that, Turkey expects various 
benefit from the project including “positive ROI(Return on Investment), job creation, 
capability development, sustainment of indigenous defense capabilities, technological spin-
offs”, and integration of Trkish defense industry into the world arms market(Cakir et al., 2008, 
102). In Joint Strike Fighter Project emerged in 1995, Turkey planed to acquire 100 F-35A 
aircrafts. In the project, Turkish offset method, participation way, and result expected were 
similar to those of the A400M Transport Aircraft Project(Cakir et al., 2008). 
On the one hand, there has been few arms trade between South Korea and Turkey. 
Turkey’s arms procurements from abroad have conducted with the NATO nations and the 
U.S.A.(MOFAT, 2005). 
 
2. SOUTH KOREA AND K-9 SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY 
South Korea’s development of a new self-propelled artillery with the striking distance 
of more than 40 km should be conducted by the R&D method, not introduction of relevant 
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technology or licensed production. Germany’s PzH2000 which can also attack the enemy 40 
km far was fielded in 1998, and the U.S.’s Crusader15 with the striking distance of 50 km 
was expected to be fielded in 2006(Bae, Kim, Ko & Lee, 2002). These production 
technologies could not be introduced to South Korea due to their policies protecting state-of-
the-art technologies. South Korea needed acquisition of a new artillery with high 
performance in order to offset quantitative disadvantage of firepower against North Korea. 
Thus, the Agency for Defense Development, a governmental defense R&D institute decided 
to develop a new artillery with performance more than that of the PzH2000 and the Crusader. 
 
Ground Firepower South Korea North Korea Ratio 
Field Artillery 5,200 8,500 1:1.63 
MLRS 200 5,100 1:25.5 
Total 5,400 13,600 1:2.52 
Table 7: Comparison of Ground Firepower(MOD, 2008) with author’s own adjustment 
 
In fact, in 1987 the ADD suggested to the Korean Army Headquarter improvement of 
performance of the K-55 self-propelled artillery which had been produced by Samsung 
Techwin under license right of the U.S. in order to utilize the K-55 for the Corps. The Army 
Headquarter, which did not share the requirement, rejected that, but the ADD did not give up 
the improvement and decided to develop a self-propelled artillery based on a new concept. In 
developing new one, the ADD considered a 155mm/52caliber barrel which is suitable for the 
Trajectory Agreement of September 1987 made by the U.S., England, Germany, and Italy. In 
other word, the ADD considered its future exportation as well as the world top level of 
performance. Self-development is the prerequisite of exportation. For this reason, the K-55, 
which had been produced under license right of the U.S., could not be exported by South 
                                            
15 The Crusader Project was canceled in 2002 due to the budget problem. After that, the 
U.S.’s main-force artillery has been the M109A6 Paladin. 
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Korea to others. Therefore, the reject of Korean Army Headquarter was connected to the 
willingness for R&D of a new artillery which will make huge exports(Yoon, 2003).   
K-9 self-propelled gun project was implemented as a form of the government-led 
project16. In other word, a government paid the R&D cost, and managed the whole process. 
When considering development of the defense industry, the contractor-led way was needed, 
but South Korean government decided the government-led because it set the priority on 
improvement of localization and technology competitiveness through self-development(Bae 
el al., 2002). When exporting products, more localization gives more profit to an exporter. 
Thus, the project method was also suitable for its exportation. 
 
Input Concept Reseach 
Search 
Development 
System 
Development Total 
Period 1989~1991 1992 1993~1998 1989~1998 
Budget(billion) 2.67 7.38 138.88 148.93 
Workforce 22.5 78.8 464.2 565.5 
Table 8: Inputs in Each Level during the K-9 R&D(ADD, 2008) with author’s own adjustment 
 
Although ROC suggested by the Army Headquarter in 1990 greatly exceeded the 
technological capacity of the domestic defense industry, coordination of ADD, relevant 
contractors, and some research institutes finally satisfied the ROC, inputting 565 persons17, 9 
years and about 148.93 billion. The K-9 can carry out the ‘counterfire operation’ and the 
‘operation in enemy depth’ by striking targets within 40 km, and fire within 30 seconds from 
receiving fire-order by using automatic fire control system(Yoon, 2003). Because moving and 
                                            
16 There are 3 way in the defense procurement project, according to how to manage the R&D 
and business. In the government-led, a government manages both R&D and business. In the 
defense contractor-led, a contractor can manage both the R&D and business. In addition, in 
the defense contractor-led, a contractor can manage only the R&D, and in this case, business 
is managed by a government(Bae el al, 2002). 
17 Because of precise relevant data, the workforce is just the average of the R&D budget in 
proportion to total budget. 
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loading an ammunition inside the artillery become automatic, the it can fire rapidly 3 times 
per 15 seconds or maximumly 18 times per 3 minutes or constantly 2 times per a minute 
during 1 hour(Samsung Techwin, n.d.). Furthermore, it can carry out ‘Time on Target18’ by 
itself, which means striking a target at the same time. It fires 1st ammunition at the high 
altitude, 2nd one at middle altitude, and 3rd one at the low altitude by calculating each altitude 
rapidly. Accordingly, the striking and TOT capacities of K-9 Thunder are 3 times that of other 
conventional artilleries. Viability is also superior by using high-strength armor produced 
domestically, and dominant mobility makes “Shoot & Scoot” possible, which means rapidly 
hiding itself in shelter after fires(Yoon, 2003). In a word, it was an innovation in the Korean 
defense industry. 
 
Figure 9: Time on Target(Samsung Techwin, n.d.) 
The K-9 Thunder’s great performance can be known by comparing with PzH2000, 
AS90, and Paladin. It has comparative advantage in the performance and price. The K-9 has 
superiority in almost capabilities including striking distance, rapidity of fire, viability, 
ammunition carrying capacity and mobility than the U.S.’s Paladin, and does so in striking 
distance, reactivity and mobility than England’s AS90(Yoon, 2003). When comparing with 
Germany’s PzH2000, the K-9 has small disadvantage in ammunition carrying capacity and 
rapidity of fire, but shows similar capacity in striking distance and reactivity, and advantage 
in mobility(Yoon, 2003). Above all, the K-9 Thunder is 3.7 billion won(Lee, 2009), which is 
                                            
18 Before the K-9, Time on Target commonly was carried out by several guns or batteries. 
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cheaper by 40% than the PzH2000(Kim, 2002). Thus, it can say that the K-9 have 
competitiveness in the world arms market. 
3. SELECTING PROCESS 
Despite of the K-9’s outstanding performances, it was not famous in the world arms 
market, and there were many obstacles in exporting it. Case of the K-9 Thunder export to 
Turkey is a milestone for the Korean defense industry resulting from coordination of Ministry 
of Defense, the Army Headquarter, ADD, and Samsung Techwin(Yoon, 2003). Before the 
case, small guns and K-200 armored vehicle had been exported, but the first massive export 
of defense product which developed by own technology was the K-9 case(Baek, 2004).  
Just after the K-9 mass production contract between the Korean Army and Samsung 
Techwin, Il-sung Moon, leader of the Acquisition Office within MOD visited in Ankara in 
March 1999, and suggested the technology transfer and co-production of the K-9 to Turkey. 
Moon ordered colonel Hyun-soo Ko, a Defense Attach to prepare presentation and promotion 
of K-9, who had studied Military Science in Turkey and made a lot of Turkish officer friends. 
Colonel Ko made Korea, which participated in the competition the most lately, hold briefing 
session of the K-9 prior to other competitors through helps of his Turkish alumni. The colonel 
Ko’s presentation produced a deep impression of high-ranking officers who exceptionally 
participated in the session(Yoon, 2003).  
However, the K-9 was not yet known well, and expectation for the export was still not 
positive because Turkey was still interested in PzH2000. It is hard for Turkey to choose other 
one except the PzH2000 because Greek was holding the PzH2000, which was known as the 
most powerful one. Thus, South Korea’s diplomatic efforts to make a contract began. In 
August 1999 when massive earthquake happened in Izmir, Turkey, General Dong-shin Kim, 
the Army Chief of Staff visited there as the first case of foreign General’s visiting, and 
handed over donation to General Attila, Turkish Land Forces Commander. It was broadcasted 
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live nationwide. In the meeting with General Attila, General Kim explained superiority of the 
K-9 and the possibility of the technology transfer and co-production. South Korean Ministry 
of Defense and defense contractors also made donation and handed over that to Turkey(Yoon, 
2003).  
Meanwhile, Germany, which had been succeeded in making the first prototype of 
Turkish self-propelled gun, could not implement the contract with Turkey any more in August 
1999, and Turkey broke the contract with Germany(ADD, 2002). It was assumed that the 
Germany’s political interest impacted that. Some Germany politicians opposed the export of 
arms to Turkey because of its oppression against ethnic Kurds(Song, 2001). In November 
1999, Sung-tae Cho, Minister of Defense visited in Turkey, and promised a governmental 
guarantee on the K-9 if Turkey bought it. As a result, in September 1, 1999 Turkey expressed 
an intention to send inspectors in order to assure performance of the K-9 and South Korean 
defense industry, and the inspectors visited in Korea in September 12, 1999(Yoon, 2003). 
Turkish inspectors were impressed with the K-9’s performance and relevant facilities. 
After coming back to Turkey, they canceled plan to visit in Israel regarding their self-
propelled artillery project. In February 2000, Turkey requested South Korea to send the 
Technology Assessment Team, and South Korea dispatched the Task Force led by Dr. Dong-
soo Kim, colonel who had led the whole K-9 Project. They assessed level of Turkish defense 
industry and interests of two countries, and negotiated production of Turkish self-propelled 
gun. Outline of the negotiation was to co-develop Turkish gun by using main component 
imported from South Korea with technological assistance from South Korea. In May 2000, 
General Attila and Yong-ok Park, the vice Minister of Defense made a MOU on Turkish self-
propelled artillery in Seoul. Context of the MOU was that South Korea exports main content 
through Samsung Techwin, the prime contractor, and Turkey guaranteed $1 billion worth of 
imports which can make 350 guns until 2011. Actually, it was a production by Turkey 
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through the technology introduction. Above all, it was a conditional agreement under 
prerequisite of success in developing a prototype of Turkish self-propelled artillery, and if 
Turkey would export the gun to others, South Korea would receive license fee from Turkey. 
In September 2000, the Task Force dispatched from South Korea succeeded in making the 
prototype of Turkish gun, and Turkey named the gun as “Pirtina”, which means storm in 
Turkish similar to Thunder. Therefore, in July 2001, two countries made the first contract 
regarding $65 million of trade which can make 24 guns(Yoon, 2002).  
In the process, there was many crisises for South Korea. One of the crisises is 
regarding engine of the K-9 that imported from the MTU firm, Germany. When the MOU is 
made, Germany informed that it would not allow supply of the MTU engine. Germany’s 
some politicians opposed supply of the engine because the K-9 would be exported to Turkey 
which had suppressed the ethnic Kurds(Song, 2001). The Task Force considered to substitute 
MTU engine by an engine of Perkins firm, the U.K., and all available government 
organization tried to persuade Germany government(Yoon, 2003). Especially, South Korean 
government required Germany government to permit supply of the MTU engine as 
compensation of importing submarines from Germany(Song, 2001). South Korea informed 
that South Korea would not coordinate on any business with Germany if Germany did not 
permit that(Yoon, 2003). As a result, in September 2000, Germany approved supply of the 
MTU engine(Yoon, 2003). Another crisises were some damages and faults of components, 
but these became opportunities to show off Korean technological superiority by treating them 
rapidly. Above all, the biggest crisis was the financial crisis in 2001 which Turkey had not 
experienced before. Turkish public opinion had opposed the project due to lack of foreign 
currency. Meanwhile, Turkish General Hüseyin Kivrikoğlu, the Chief of General Staff 
ordered strike demonstration of fire equipments including the K-9, and it would be 
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broadcasted live nationwide. In the demonstration, the K-9 was the highlight, and precisely 
hit the target 40 km far. Finally, the opposite voice lost the power(Yoon, 2003). 
 
4. IMPACTS OF THE K-9 OFFSET TRADE WITH TURKEY 
Then, how are the actual impacts of the K-9 export and offset transaction? Are those 
great like what was expected at that time? Evaluating the precise impacts is not almost 
impossible due to security problem, impossibility of inducing only impacts of the export out 
of all, and etc. Some studies have been conducted by public institutes, and these dealt with 
the impacts of whole sales of the K-9, a sum of domestic sales and export. Impacts of the K-9 
exports can be extracted from these studies. Because the K-9’s domestic sales and exports are 
similar, simple comparison of whole sales and exports is convincing. For these reasons, this 
paper will use simple estimate which compares export to all sales. The K-9’s export volume 
is 350 units, 1.3 trillion won19 until 2011, domestic sales volume is 255 units, 1.547 trillion 
won until 200720(ADD, 2008)(Baek, 2004). Thus, this paper will simply see impacts of the 
export to Turkey as 45.7% of impacts caused by whole sales, based on the value. 
  
4.1. IMPACTS ON EMPLOYMENT 
Impacts of K-9 exports on employment can be assumed indirectly through the total 
worth of export, the workers requirement coefficient, and the employees21 requirement 
coefficient.  
Baek’s study in 2004 explained this process. The workers requirement coefficient 
includes all labors needed indirectly in the production spread process as well as labors needed 
                                            
19 $ 1 billion worth of K-9 export to Turkey is converted to Korean won by applying the 
average exchange rate of 2001($1 = 1298 won). 
20 Although the volume of export is larger than domestic sales, the total worth of domestic 
sales is greater than that of export because export has been restricted to some main 
components of the K-9. 
21 Employees = Workers – (persons self-employed + unwaged family workers) 
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directly in producing 1 unit of output in a certain industry. In other word, the coefficient is 
workers required directly or indirectly in the industry and other industries as demand increase 
by 1 billion won. The workers requirement coefficient of the Korean defense industry is 18.5, 
of which the defense itself accounts for 67.5%, and followed by food, accommodation, 
whole/retail sales, general machine and etc. In addition, the employees requirement 
coefficient refers to employees caused in a certain industry and other industries by 1 billion 
won increase of demand in the industry. The employees requirement coefficient of defense 
expenditure is 16.5, of which defense itself account for 76%. From those, workers and 
employees generated by 2.874 trillion won of K-9 expenditure, sum of domestic sales and 
export to Turkey are as follow: 
 
Classification Workers Requirement Effect Employees Requirement Effect
Persons generated directly 20,499 18,780 
Persons generated indirectly 17,339 11,964 
Total 37,838 30,744 
Table 9: Workers and Employees Requirement Effect of K-9 Project(Baek, 2004) 
 
We can induce the impacts of the K-9 export to Turkey on employment, by applying 
45.7% to all columns of Table 9. The impacts are positively presented, as shown in table 10. 
 
Classification Workers Requirement Effect Employees Requirement Effect
Persons generated directly 9,368 8,582 
Persons generated indirectly 7,924 5,468 
Total 17,292 14,050 
Table 10: Workers and Employees Requirement Effect of K-9 Export  
 
Then, how many jobs have been transferred to Turkey by the offset trade? South Korea 
loses the jobs at final assembly stage, because main context of the contract is transferring 
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technology, final assembly by Turkish firms, and components supply by South Korea. Unit 
price of the K-9 final product is about 3.7 billion won, while unit price of the K-9 
components exported to Turkey in 2002 was 2.7 billion won(ADD, 2008). In other word, 
about 1 billion won of production activity per a K-9 occurs in Turkey. Because 350 units of 
export is guaranteed, total production activity transferred to Turkey is about 350 billion won. 
From that, we can induce the impacts of the offsets on employment, by applying 12.2% to all 
columns of Table 9. 
Classification Workers Requirement Effect Employees Requirement Effect
Persons generated directly 2,496 2,291 
Persons generated indirectly 2,115 1,460 
Total 4,611 3,751 
Table 11: Workers and Employees Requirement Effect of the K-9 Offset 
 
When comparing Table 10 with Table 11, the impacts of offsets are relatively small, 
about a fourth of impacts of the export. By scarifying small jobs, South Korea can get much 
larger jobs. Besides, South Korea seldom faces job loss at the subcontractors, which the U.S. 
worries the most seriously in conducting offsets. Consequently, impacts of the K-9 offset 
trade are very positive. 
 
4.2. IMPACTS ON TRADE BALANCE 
Worth of the K-9 export to Turkey is $ 1 billion until 2011, actually small when 
compared to whole trade volume of South Korea. However, it is very meaningful for the 
South Korea’s defense industry when comparing with total $5.5 million of 2000 defense 
exports(ADD, 2002). Table 12 and Figure 10 show the defense exports of South Korea have 
increased from 2001 when export of the K-9 began. Table 13 and Figure 11 shows how big 
portion the K-9 export has taken out of whole defense exports. 
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Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Whole 
Exports 
($10,000) 
14,719 19,663 5,537 23,720 14,390 24,061 41,901 26,189 25,526 84,493
Rate of 
Increase(%) 153.7 33.6 -71.8 328.4 -39.3 67.2 74.1 -37.5 -2.5 231.0
Offsets 
(Proportion) 
920 
(6.3%) 
1,492 
(7.6%) 
111 
(2.0%) 
852 
(3.6%)
299 
(2.1%)
3,780 
(15.7%)
7,613 
(18.2%)
10,953 
(41.8%) 
5,800 
(22.7%) 
23,230
(27.5%)
Table 12: Annual Defense Exports Value of South Korea(Moon, 2008) with author’s own 
adjustment 
 
 
Figure 10: Trend of the Defense Exports and Offsets of South Korea(Moon, 2008) with 
author’s own adjustment 
 
 
Year Unit Value Quantity Exports Value ($10,000) 
Total Defense Exports of 
South Korea($10,000) 
Proportion of K-
9 Export 
2000 3,350 1(Prototype) 335 5,537 6.1% 
2001 2,708 24 6,500 23,720 27.4% 
2002 2,708 24 6,500 14,390 45.2% 
2003 2,438 16 3,900 24,061 16.2% 
Total  65 17,235 67,708 25.5% 
Table 13: Contribution of the K-9 Export to Defense Exports(ADD, 2008) with author’s own 
adjustment  
 
  
Unit: $10,000 
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Figure 11: Change of the Defense Exports Proportion(Moon, 2008) 
 
Above all, export of the K-9 is very meaningful in opening new market. The exports 
contributed to diversification of South Korea’s export products, and became an opportunity to 
show off the technological superiority of South Korea’s defense industry. Until 1990s, South 
Korea had exported only small guns in the fire weapons market, however, after the export, it 
entered into the system weapons market(Moon, 2008). In addition, the defense exports of 
South Korea had been concentrated on the South-East Asia, but the K-9 export became the 
first case of selling system weapons to the Middle-East Market(Moon, 2008). After that, 
Indonesia and Australia are negotiating with South Korea to purchase the K-9, and $410 
million of KT-1 Trainer and $223 million of K-2 Tank were exported to Turkey, Indonesia 
and Europe(ADD, 2008).  
The export can be connected to even other additional exports. It is expected that Turkey 
will purchase additional munitions involved(ADD, 2008) and components for repair in the 
future, because usually such weapons are utilized for several decades. The K-10 Munitions 
Transporting Vehicle, which carries the K-9’s munitions, is also expected to be sold to 
Turkey(ADD, 2002).  
 Inflow of foreign currency to South Korea is expected through license, if Turkey 
exports the Pirtina to other country. If do that, South Korea will receive license fee according 
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to the contract. Of course, exports of the Pirtina are likely to be recognized as appearance of 
competitor in the world arms market. However, Turkey should import main components used 
for production from South Korea in order to make more Pirtina. Therefore, exports of Pirtina 
will increase income of South Korea. 
Then, trade balance of South Korea is hurt by the offset trade? The technology transfer 
is actually not free. South Korea has sold some components, of which price is 114% of 
domestic procurement price(ADD, 2002). Although the excessive 14% per 1 gun may be a 
little cheaper than actual value of technology, the offset trade is very greatly positive to trade 
balance of South Korea, as above noted. Previously noted, while about 350 billion won of 
production activities are transferred, income caused by the export is $1 billion or 1.3 trillion 
won. Consequently, it can say that the export case has contributed to trade balance of South 
Korea very positively. 
 
4.3. IMPACTS ON THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
The K-9 export to Turkey has greatly contributed to the South Korean defense industry. 
It can be known by reviewing the K-9’s relevant capacity utilization rates and income 
distribution structure. As previously mentioned, impacts of the export on capacity utilization 
and income are regarded as 45.7% of all.  
South Korea’s defense contractors are commonly running the both defense businesses 
and civil or commercial businesses(Moon, 2008). However, average capacity utilization rate 
has declined constantly since 1986(Moon, 2008), and accordingly profit of the defense 
industry has deteriorated. It is because of that demand of the South Korea Army for 
conventional weapons has decreased due to completion of fielding of those weapons(Kim, 
2003). For example, production of the K-55 artillery, which is still the main-force artillery of 
South Korea, was finished in 1997 when the 1040th gun was supplied(Army Headquarter, 
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n.d.), Thus the K-55-related facilities are suffering lack of works, but cannot be removed due 
to the security problem. 
 
1986 1990 1993 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
77.8 55.6 54.2 52.8 48.5 50.3 54.5 57.3 56.1 57.8 60.6 
Table 14: Average Capacity Utilization Rate of Defense Contractors between 1986 and 2006 
(Moon, 2008) 
 
In such situation, export of the K-9 has contributed to firms’ maintenance of defense 
facilities. On average, capacity utilization rates of firms related to the K-9 are higher than 
other defense firms. As shown in Table 15, the K-9 facility has been run frequently when 
comparing with others.  
 
Firm Weapon (Component) 
Annual Average 
Possible 
Production 
Late 3 years’ 
Annual Average 
Production 
Capacity 
Utilization 
Rate 
Doosan 
Infracore 
Biho 30 17 56.7 
Chunma 20 12 60.0 
K-200-related 
Performance Upgrade - 42 - 
Rotem 
K1A1 Tank 80 46 57.5 
Recovery Tank 15 8 53.3 
Out-sourcing 
Maintenance 50 42 84.0 
Decontamination 
Equipment 120 45 37.5 
Samsung 
Techwin 
Mobile 
Equipment
K-10  50 9 18.0 
K-77 20 0 0.0 
K-9 100 54 54.0 
KAAV 20 15 75.0 
Engine of 
Aircraft 
F110 Engine - 14 - 
F404 Engine - 4 - 
Engine of 
Ship 
LM2500 
Engine - 4 - 
Table 15: Production Capacities and Capacity Utilization Rates of Main Defense Contractors 
between 2003 and 2006(Moon, 2008) 
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In addition, capacity utilization rates of facilities producing munitions of the K-9 are 
relatively high. In Table 16, shaded parts are related to the K-9, among which three except 
155mm RAP are used for only the K-9. The 155mm RAP is used for K-179, K-55, and K-9, 
but demands of K-179 and K-55 are very small because their productions are completely 
finished. According to prerequisite, about half of the impacts have been generated from the 
export. 
 
Firm Weapon (Component) 
Annual Average 
Possible 
Production 
Late 3 years’ 
Annual Average 
Production 
Capacity 
Utilization 
Rate 
Hanhwa 
130mm Multi Launch Rocket 
Confidential 
32.5 
Proximity Fuze M732 Fuze 51.3 
K-4 High Explosive Dual Purpose 9.2 
K-9 Propelling Munition 70.8 
Korean Mine-Scatterer Munition 29.8 
2.75˝ Dual Purpose Distribution Munition 41.7 
81mm High Explosive Dual Purpose 12.6 
Pomins-II 44.7 
K731 Torpedo Component 13.0 
K701C Mine Component 20.8 
Chunma Munition Component 44.0 
227mm Multi Launch Rocket 32.2 
Light Weight Grenade 32.5 
KM739A1 Fuze 8.6 
KM577A1 Fuze 11.7 
KT-1/KO-1 Component 68.4 
T-50 Component 66.7 
KMK-45 Component 20.0 
Poongsan 
155mm K310 DP-ICM BB 
Confidential 
67.6 
5.56 Munition 61.6 
155mm K-307 BB-HE 68.7 
120mm High Explosive Anti-Tank-Tracer 93.9 
227mm Rocket Warhead Complex 182.9 
50 Caliber Machine Gun Munition 62.7 
20mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery Munition 28.5 
105mm High Explosive Anti-Tank-Tracer 30.1 
155mm RAP 38.5 
Table 16: Production Capacities and Capacity Utilization Rates of Munition Defense 
Contractors between 2003 and 2006(Moon, 2008) 
On the one hand, the prime contractor of the K-9, Samsung Techwin’s sales including 
the K-9 sales account for 40% of whole defense sale of South Korea(Moon, 2008). Figure 12 
shows that 106 1st suppliers including main 9 firms and maximum 170 2nd tier suppliers are 
participating in the K-9 business(Moon, 2008). In other word, a lot of firms are getting profit 
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from the business, and about half of the incomes are generated from the export to Turkey. 
 
Figure 12: The K-9 Production Structure(Moon, 2008) 
Annual average sales of the K-9 of Samsung Techwin are 241.2 billion won(Moon, 
2008). 113.7 billion won are distributed to 1st tier suppliers, and among 113.7 billion won, 
49.6 billion won are transferred to 2nd tier suppliers(Moon, 2008). Among main 9 1st tier 
suppliers, A, B, C and G companies greatly depend on the K-9 sales. Thus, the K-9 export 
which account for 45.7% of total sales is very important for many firms. 
 
Figure 13: Distribution of Income Generated by the K-9 
Business(Moon, 2008) 
Then, how much the defense industry of South Korea is hurt by the offset trade? Its 
damage is not great. Only final assembly works has been transferred, so only small potential 
income of the prime contractor has not occurred. When considering contribution mentioned 
above, the impacts of the K-9 export are very positive to the defense industry of South Korea.  
Main 1st 
Suppliers(9) 
2nd Suppliers 
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4.4. IMPACTS ON THE DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS 
Impacts of the K-9 export on the defense preparedness can be known through capacity 
utilization rates and change of procurement expenditure. As mentioned earlier, the capacity 
utilization rates of relevant facilities have increased. It means that South Korea could reduce 
the level of worry regarding a security problem caused by close of defense firms. Besides, the 
massive production caused by increasing production capacity usually reduces the production 
cost. However, the unit production cost is not disclosed by the defense firms. Thus, save of 
governmental procurement expenditure cannot be discussed in this paper.  
Then, how much the K-9 offset trade is injurious to the national security of South 
Korea? Above all, the risk when the technology transferred is leaked out to North Korea is 
very small. Interoperability of arms between South and North Korea is much low. In addition, 
since South Korea protected state-of-the-art technology from Turkey(ADD, 2002), North 
Korea cannot get the latest technology through any channel from Turkey. Even regarding 
source dependency problem, it has not made any damage to the defense preparedness of 
South Korea because it does not import components from Turkey. Rather, it is harmful to 
security of Turkey, because the contract increases Turkey’s foreign component dependency. 
As a result, positive impact caused by increasing capacity utilization rate and no damage 
generated by the offset trade totally make positive impacts on the defense preparedness of 
South Korea. 
 
4.5. POSSIBILITY OF COMPETITOR APPEARANCE 
The most worrying problem of the technology transfer is the appearance of the future 
competitor. While Turkey’s desire was to foster its own defense industry through the 
technology transfer, big concern of South Korea was just that. As a result, any export of 
Turkey’s Pirtina to other nations has not been reported from 2001 to now.  
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With time, Turkey becomes to know that the technology transfer, co-production, and 
licensed production are not greatly helpful to indigenous development of Turkish defense 
industry. Rather, it has accumulated much technologies and know-how through joint-venture 
procurement projects. Currently, Turkish SSM’s priorities policy of offsets are orderly; above 
all pursuit of “initiating indigenous projects for enhancing critical industrial capabilities”; if 
impossible, as next one, “joint development, perhaps with multinational collaboration”; as 
final demand, “co/licensed production and other offsets”(Cakir et al., 2008, 90). A speech 
taken from an international conference supported by SSM said: 
In today’s world, developed countries are focused on the indigenous solutions, 
mutual development and international cooperation projects to meet their defense 
weapon systems requirements. Depending on the experience regarding the foreign 
dependency and being aware of the benefits of the indigenous or joint development 
models for Turkey, buy off the shelf and co/licensed production models are being 
diminished. Indigenous development projects [of Turkey] … can be considered as 
a leading model for this tendency.  
Therefore, it is assessed that it is going to be more beneficial for us to participate 
actively and on time in joint projects initiated mainly by U.S.A and EU and other 
countries while both developing indigenous solutions and meeting large volume 
development costs and time. Other than this, seeking the international participation 
to the Turkish development projects should be evaluated as an alternative target as 
well. (Cakir et al. 2008, 90-91) 
From the SSM’s viewpoint, we can know that Turkey has not been satisfied by the 
technology transfer as offsets. In other word, Turkey has not accomplished purposes of 
offsets which include becoming a magnate in the world arms market.  
There are some reasons regarding that Turkey cannot become a competitor. 
South Korea made the agreement with Turkey, which included the technology transfer 
after concluding that the possibility of making competitor is low. One of missions of the 
Technology Assessment Team sent to Turkey in 2000 was to evaluate the possibility. After 
visiting in many defense facilities, the team concluded that Turkish firms could not make a 
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own system design, and overall technological level is much lower than that of South 
Korea(ADD, 2002). However, some hardware can be imitated if many technological data are 
leaked out to Turkey(ADD, 2002). As a result, overall possibility of making a competitor was 
depreciated.  
In addition, South Korea protected state-of-the-art technologies from being transferred. 
South Korea distinguished technologies into 3 categories which included targets transferred, 
targets negotiated, and targets protected(ADD, 2002). 47.2% of technologies were selected as 
targets negotiated, and 37.2 % were not allowed to be transferred. At the initial period of 
negotiation, South Korea decided to willingly transfer only 15.4% technologies. Previously 
mentioned, because developing countries do not know the technologies well, Turkey was at 
disadvantage in the negotiation. Thus, Turkey should still develop the state-of-the-art 
technologies by itself. 
Another main reason is the supply method of the components. In order to make 
additional Turkish self-propelled artilleries, Turkey should import components from South 
Korea. Value of the components may include transportation cost, administrative cost caused 
by additional negotiation and etc. Production cost of the Turkish gun is surely higher than 
South Korea’s gun. Accordingly, these make Turkish gun’s price higher and less attractive to 
potential consumers than price of South Korea’s gun.  
Consequently, although the technology transfer improves Turkey’s technology to some 
degree, it is still not a competitor against South Korea. Turkey is required to develop state-of-
the-art technologies by itself through R&D in order to be a magnate in the world arms market. 
On the other hand, the technology transfer was a great tool of South Korea to attract Turkey. 
Thus, South Korea does not make a competitor in the world arms market, but got huge 
benefit through the K-9 offsets, the technology transfer.  
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5. FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS OF THE K-9 OFFSET AGREEMENT  
The result of the K-9 offset transaction, the technology transfer is very successful for 
South Korea. Like this case, if some offset contract will be forecasted to give benefit to South 
Korea in the future, it will have to do its best in making the offset agreement. In this regard, 
the export case provides South Korea, a rookie in the world arms market with important 
implication on how to overcome many obstacles and how to make an offset agreement. Thus, 
this paper reorganizes what were stated previously according to the criteria already explained 
in the chapter Ⅳ. 
 
5.1. BUYER-RELATED FACTORS 
Turkey’s offset experiences as a consumer are enough to participate in negotiation. As 
earlier noted, Turkey completed 22 transactions, and 55 transactions were in progress from 
1984 to 2008. Thus, this factor impacted the agreement positively. 
From South Korea’s viewpoint, possibility that Turkey would become a competitor in 
the world arms market was small. Defense industrial base of Turkey is not systemic, but 
leakage of critical technology data could raise the possibility. For this reason, South Korea 
reduced the possibility by protecting state-of-the-art technologies. Thus, this factor also acted 
positively. 
Technical experience of Turkey to assembly the gun as the final level was sufficient. 
The Technology Assessment Team concluded that Turkey’s technology to make a design was 
not enough, but skill to make final products according to design transferred by South Korea 
was sufficient. This factor was positive for the agreement. 
On the other hand, Turkey’s overall environments were not good. Political situation 
was unsecured, and specifically economic environment was the worst. In early 2001 just 
before when the agreement was made, Turkey faced the most serious financial crisis that it 
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has ever undertaken. Public opinion that opposed the deal was fierce. Thus, although 
relationship with South Korea has been great, this factor also acted negatively. 
 
5.2. SELLER-RLATED FACTORS 
There were compatible goals in making the agreement. Turkey’s purposes of the 
agreement were both to procure superior self-propelled artillery through the main contract, 
and at the same time to get high technology to strengthen its defense industry through the 
offset agreement. On the other hand, South Korea’s purposes of the agreement were both to 
open new market in the Middle-East, and to promote its technological reputation in the world 
arms market. Earning much money through the trade was certainly involved in the purposes 
of South Korea. Thus, their goals were able to be compatible, and acted positively in making 
the agreement.  
Proactive strategy was existing in South Korean government and Samsung Techwin. 
They aggressively suggested the contract with better conditions including the technology 
transfer to Turkey which was negotiating with Germany. Many high-ranking officers’ visiting 
in Turkey and donation to Turkey which was suffering earthquake impacted the agreement. 
These efforts made an opportunity to see the K-9’s performance with Turkey’s eyes, and 
finally eliminated Turkey’s uncertainty about the K-9’s performance and South Korea’s less 
experience as an exporting country. Thus, this factor affected positively success of the offset 
agreement. 
There was an in-house offset group in South Korean government. After visiting of the 
Technology Assessment Team in Turkey, the team asked government to organize the project 
management team(ADD, 2002). The TAT emphasized on necessity to review the draft of 
MOU, possibility of design change of self-propelled gun, and increase of the staff(ADD, 
2002). Existence and activities of the TAT and the project management team positively 
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worked on the success of the agreement. 
Top management was great to inspire other members in driving the offset agreement. 
Colonel Dong-soo Kim, who had participated in the K-9 project from R&D, was the leader of 
the project management team(Kim, 2009). Lieutenant colonel Eung-chun Kim, a member of 
the TAT stated that as a leader, Kim’s leadership was a determinant which induced 
responsibility and solidarity for success of the project(Yoon, 2003). In addition, the Minister 
of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff tried to succeed in the agreement. Thus, this factor 
acted positively for success of the agreement. 
Many relevant people made a commitment to success of the offset agreement. They 
never gave up when Germany did not allow supply of the MTU engine. All relevant 
governmental organizations tried to solve the problem through diplomatic means. In addition, 
lieutenant colonel Kim stated that the task force members tried to overcome the problem, 
deciding to take responsibility for the works which could cause diplomatic problems(YOON, 
2003). All staff tried to succeed in transferring technology. Therefore, this factor was positive 
for successful agreement. 
However, international offset experience of South Korea was not sufficient. As shown 
in Table 12 and Figure 10, South Korea had not experienced big offsets until 2001, and the 
contract was almost the first case for South Korea. Therefore, less experience acted 
negatively for the success. 
In addition, South Korea was not a big seller in the word arms market when comparing 
with other competitors. Germany and Israel which were competitors in the contract had more 
diverse products and power in the weapons market. In other word, the compensation practices 
from South Korea that Turkey could choose were less. Therefore, this factor also acted 
negatively for success of the offset agreement. 
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5.3. CONTRACT-RELATED FACTORS 
The transferability of obligation could be not studied due to limitation of access to the 
data. Thus, this paper leaves this factor unsolved. 
The agreement was made in two forms of MOU and the main contract. MOU between 
two countries was made before the main contract. Success of developing a prototype of 
Turkish self-propelled gun by Korean experts was the prerequisite of the main contract. After 
making MOU, South Korean experts succeeded in making a prototype, and then the main 
contract was made. Thus, this factor was positive to successful offset agreement.  
The size of the sales was large enough. Because the worth of main contract was $1 
billion, this contact was much attractive to South Korea. In addition, the technology was 
precious because at that time there was no country holding technology to make 155mm 
/52caliber of self-propelled gun with more than 40 km of striking distance except South 
Korea and Germany. The contract was attractive to both countries. Therefore, the factor was 
positive to success of the agreement. 
Long payback period and low penalties are not applied to this case. In the deal, South 
Korea had no obligation to pay back after making the main contract. It was a conditional 
contract, and after success of developing prototype South Korea had no burden of payback 
and penalties. Therefore, it is not suitable to apply these factors to this case. 
 
5.4. PRODUCT-RELATED FACTORS 
As above mentioned, the technologies transferred were attractive to Turkey, though 
only some of all were transferred. In the prototype-making process, South Korean experts 
assured the superiority. They changed hardware and software for Turkish gun, and solved all 
problems which occurred suddenly. These raised the creditability of Turkey. Thus, this factor 
acted positively in making the offset agreement. 
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Uniqueness of the K-9 is also great. Turkey set a priority on mobility of gun, and that 
of the K-9 satisfied Turkey(ADD, 2002). What Turkey wanted was especially mobility in the 
severe environment such as extreme coldness. The prototype showed off the satisfactory 
mobility through tests in Turkey. Long striking distance also satisfied Turkey which should 
prepare for potential risk from Greece which held PzH2000. In addition, Korean experts 
constantly revised the performances according to Turkey’s requirements and ROC in the 
prototype-making process. Therefore, this factor acted positively in the success of the 
agreement. 
The most decisive factor affecting the successful agreement was superiority of the K-9. 
Turkish inspectors recognized the superiority of the K-9 by watching relevant facilities and 
fire test, when they visited in South Korea. During the biggest crisis, Turkey’s serious 
financial crisis, precise fire power of the K-9 which was broadcasted live nationwide in 
Turkey weakened the internal public opinion which opposed the project. In other word, what 
overcame the biggest crisis was just superiority of the K-9. Therefore, the factor acted 
positively in succeeding the agreement. 
 
5.5. SUMMARY AND FINDING 
How the factors affected success of the offset agreement is summarized in table 17. 
Above all, the determinant of successful agreement is the very product. However, if Turkey 
had not assured the K-9’s superiority, it would not have purchase the product. Despite of 
South Korea’s less offset experience and disadvantageous position in the market, what made 
an opportunity to see the K-9’s superiority with Turkey’s eyes was the proactive strategy. The 
task force, top management, and members’ commitment supported the proactive strategy. 
Contract-related factors did not critically affect success of the agreement. As a result, this 
case gives a critical implication to South Korea. That is just to sell a superior product with the 
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proactive strategy.  
 
Category Factors affecting Success of Offset Agreement Impact 
Factors related 
to Buyer 
International experience 
(countertrade or especially offsets) Positive 
Not being viewed as a competitor Positive 
Technical experience Positive 
Sufficient financial resources Negative 
Stable environment 
(economic, political, social, security-related) and 
relationship with a exporting country 
Negative 
Factors related 
to Seller 
Compatible goals(not same) Positive 
Proactive strategy Positive 
In-house offset group Positive 
Top management support Positive 
Commitment to project Positive 
International experience Negative 
Size of seller Negative 
Factors related 
to Contract 
Transferability of obligations Not Studied 
Dual contracts(main contract and MOU or MOA) Positive 
The size of the sales Positive 
Long payback period Not Suitable 
for this case Low penalties 
Factors related 
to Product 
Mature technology Positive 
Complexity or uniqueness of product Positive 
High visibility of product Positive 
Table 17: Factors Affecting Success of Offset Agreement in Case of the K-9 Export 
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Ⅵ. RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
As earlier stated in the K-9 export case, the technology transfer is very useful tool to 
attract potential consumers. There have been many concerns about transferring late 
technology, but its adverse effect is much smaller than expected. Though the technologies 
transferred have contributed to development of Turkey’s defense industry to some degree, 
South Korea is still keeping a position of a front-running man. On the one hand, importance 
of the proactive strategy for South Korea, a beginning seller in the arms market is founded. 
Based on such finding, this paper makes 3 policy recommendations. 
As the proactive strategy, the technology transfer should be utilized in opening new 
markets. The Middle-East is the most representative potential market. There have constantly 
been many disputes in the Middle East, and this market has gradually been westernized, 
procuring U.S.-origin arms(Cho, Han, Park, Shin & Yang, 2007). South Korea of which 
weapons have interoperabilities with U.S.’s arms can sell more own products in the market, 
but exports volume of South Korea to this area is very small(Cho et al., 2007). Thus, South 
Korea needs aggressive and active strategy to open the Middle-East market(Cho et al., 2007). 
As the proactive strategy, this paper recommends aggressive search for consumers, and the 
technology transfer as offsets. Of course, the operation to protect state-of-the-art technology 
should be built. This strategy should be applied not only to the Middle-East, but to South-
East Asia, Eastern Europe, Central/South America, and Africa. Table 18 shows that ranking of 
attractive markets and their technological levels through scoring each item. Those, of which 
technological levels are lower, are very attractive to South Korea(Cho et al., 2007). On the 
other hand, this strategy is not proper to developed countries because those countries, of 
which overall technological levels are superior, can easily outpace the technological level 
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even in a self-propelled gun that South Korea has now comparative advantages than them. 
 
 Developed Countries 
South East
Asia 
Middle 
East 
Eastern 
Europe 
Central/South 
America Africa 
Defense Market’s 
Attraction Ranking 
1 
(50.1) 
2 
(31.8) 
3 
(29.3) 
4 
(19.0) 
5 
(18.1) 
6 
(12.7) 
Ranking of 
Defense Technology 
1 
(96.0) 
3 
(83.5) 
4 
(82.5) 
2 
(85.7) 
4 
(82.5) 
6 
(76.7) 
Table 18: Characteristics of Geographical Defense Markets(Cho et al., 2007) with authors 
adjustment. 
 
In addition, South Korea should stick to a position of supplier of main components 
instead of transferring technologies. In case of the K-9 export, South Korea can get benefit 
even if Turkey exports Pirtina, because South Korea holds license and supplies main 
components. As Turkey sells more Pirtinas, South Korea sells more main components to 
Turkey. In this regard, when South Korea holds a position of a main supplier, exports of 
transferee nations become complementary to exports of South Korea. Practical benefits go to 
South Korea than transferee. On the one hand, this benefit occurs more effectively, when 
localization level of the weapons is high. For example, localization level of the K-9 was 
66.8% in 2000(Baek, 2004). Therefore, South Korea should keep the position of main 
supplier, and raise localization level of a weapon exported. 
Finally, South Korea should prepare relevant law and institution which can foster the 
defense exports and offsets. Financial supports, marketing activities and etc. were already 
suggested frequently by other studies. Except those, this paper recommends the strategy to 
utilize the multiplier and a reporting system like an annual report by the U.S.’s BIS. Utilizing 
multiplier can minimize actual damage from offsets, especially the technology transfer. In 
addition, South Korea’s has not reporting system regarding offsets yet, while the U.S.’s BIS 
has annually reported trend and impacts of offsets to its Congress. Such institution is not 
required right now, because South Korea’s exports volume including offsets is still small 
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enough to easily interpret the trend and impacts without specific reporting system. However, 
before big growth of the offsets volume achieved by South Korea as a seller, relevant law and 
institution should be prepared.  
Consequently, this paper recommends aggressive use of the technology transfer, 
maintaining a main supplier position, and relevant law and institution to effectively control 
offsets. In the world arms market, there is almost no way to sell arms without compensations. 
A seller should decide what will be provided and what will be protected. From a seller’s 
viewpoint, in order to avoid subcontracting, it will be great that South Korea aggressively 
proposes the technology transfer prior to a consumer’s requirement. For the strategy, relevant 
law and institution should be prepared.  
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Ⅶ. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Until now, this paper has studied an offset trade, especially the technology transfer. 
Because many importing countries currently utilize offset trades, a seller cannot avoid that. 
There are many arguments that offsets hurt benefit of sellers, but these arguments are too 
much generalized. There are several offsetting methods, and each impact of those is different 
each other. Thus, this paper has focused on the technology transfer, and founded something 
different from general recognition. 
According to recent studies, an offset trade diversely affects on mainly employment, 
balance of trade, the defense industry, and the defense preparedness. Offsets are beneficial to 
employment, balance of trade and competitiveness of a prime contractor by increasing its 
sales, but injurious to those of subcontractors. Offsets can positively affect the defense 
preparedness by raising capacity utilization rate, but hurt that by deepening foreign source 
dependency. In addition, impacts of offsets vary according to compensating method and 
development level of a trade partner. Co-production, subcontracting, and licensed production 
are harmful things to employment, and direct offsets which developed countries desire. 
Especially, subcontracting injures employment, trade balance, and greatly the defense 
preparedness. Purchase is harmful one to trade balance, and representative indirect offsets 
which LDCs hope. 
Among offsets, the technology transfer has been regarded as much dangerous thing for 
a seller. The most anxious impact of the technology transfer is appearance of a competitor, 
but some recent studies depreciate the possibility. Although the technology transferred 
improves technological level of transferee to some degree, the impact is smaller than 
expected. This situation is generated by lack of an importing country’s technological base, 
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capital and information. In addition, a transferor actually provides only technologies except 
state-of-the-art technologies, and transferee cannot react effectively because of lack of 
relevant knowledge. For this reason, the technology transfer strategy is not suitable for 
developed countries.  
Kremer and Sain(1992) suggested 20 factors affecting success in making offset 
agreement, which are classified into buyer-related, seller-related, contract-related, and 
product-related factors. 
In order to verify findings in literature review, this paper analyzes the K-9 export case. 
It is estimated that 130 billion won earned by the export makes 17,000 workers, but jobs lost 
by offsets are small. Through the export, South Korea can get many benefits including 
diversification of export goods, exploitation of a new market, improvement of reputation, and 
expectation of exporting relevant arms. Increased capacity utilization rate and protection of 
experts are also helpful to the defense industry and the defense preparedness. Above all, 
Turkey cannot become a rival against South Korea in the self-propelled gun market. 
Importance of maintaining a supplier position of main components is founded. In addition, 
the case study proves that product-related factors decisively affect the success, and proactive 
strategy supported by commitment of top-manager and member can make up for some 
insufficiency of a seller. 
As a result, this paper recommends aggressive use of the technology transfer, 
maintenance of a main supplier position, and relevant law and institution for offsets. South 
Korea can utilize the technology transfer as the proactive strategy in attracting potential 
consumers. Becoming supplier of main components mitigates the risk that a transferee 
becomes a competitor. Relevant law and regulation including use of the multiplier and a 
reporting system should be made. 
Finally, this paper has some limitations to be supplement later if possible. Because 
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relevant data is correctly not divided into domestic sale and export, this paper uses the simple 
proportional expression. These nominal impacts have high degree of validity, but are 
approximate values. Some data are restricted to access because of security problem. In 
addition, this paper tried to impacts and influence factors of offsets, especially the technology 
transfer, but the result is rather biased toward offsets with developing or less developed 
countries. Therefore, if these limitations are made up for, relevant studies will be much more 
improved. 
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